Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

Tony Addison, Mansoob Murshed

Research output: Working paperAcademic


This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill
over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state’s opponents against the government’s external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. A rise in the external power’s preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government’s military efficiency against the rebels, who are also
terrorists against the government’s sponsor raises overall levels of violence.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationDen Haag
PublisherInternational Institute of Social Studies (ISS)
Number of pages26
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2002

Publication series

SeriesISS working papers. General series


  • ISS Working Paper-General Series


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