Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure of liability insurance coverage limit

Xue Jia, Jeroen Suijs

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Abstract

This article analyzes the disclosure of the liability insurance coverage limit and the impact of mandating disclosure of the coverage limit in a setting where voluntary disclosure of a firm’s cash flow information is subject to litigation risk and the firm has directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance. Disclosure of cash flow information is costly, but disclosure of the insurance coverage limit features no direct disclosure friction. We find that, when the litigation environment is weak, the usual unraveling argument applies, and the manager always voluntarily discloses the coverage limit in equilibrium. However, when the litigation environment is strong, either no coverage limit is disclosed or only sufficiently high coverage limits are disclosed in equilibrium. Further analysis shows that mandatory disclosure of the coverage limit increases the voluntary disclosure of cash flow information.
Original languageEnglish
Article number107029
JournalJournal of Accounting and Public Policy
Volume42
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2023

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