Abstract
Using novel and large-scale data at the individual level, we find that when a coauthor joins an editorial board of an economics journal an author publishes more articles in the “coauthor's” journal. This increase is larger, the less experienced the author is, and the more editorial power the coauthor obtains. It disappears quickly once the coauthor leaves the journal's board. A less experienced author whose coauthor joins an editorial board also publishes more in journals different from the coauthor's journal. We find that the connections-as-signals hypothesis and the identity-independent information hypothesis explain more patterns in the data than the other hypotheses we consider. Only the favoritism hypothesis can explain that, at journals with low board turnover, articles published during a coauthor's stint on the editorial board receive less citations than articles published during other years. This finding suggests that editors and publishers can address a cause of favoritism by stimulating editorial rotation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 576-595 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Volume | 200 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Aug 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We would like to thank Aksel Erbahar, Laura Hering, Marcel Fafchamps, Anne Gielen, Sanjeev Goyal, Jurjen Kamphorst, David Laband, Sacha Kapoor, Marco van der Leij, Vincent Rebeyrol, Michael Rose, Dana Sisak, and seminar and workshop audiences for their comments. Special thanks to the many students who helped us as research assistants in the data collection and to the many editors, coeditors and editorial assistants who provided us with information about their journals. Financial support from Massey University and Middlesex University is gratefully acknowledged. We also benefited from research grant INFRAIA-2016-1-730897 through the EC Research Innovation Action under the H2020 Programme and the computing resources provided by SURFsara; and the State Research Agency (Spain) grant: PID2019-111708GA-I00/ SRA (State Research Agency /10.13039/501100011033). Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Granada / CBUA. We have no conflicts of interests to declare.
Funding Information:
We would like to thank Aksel Erbahar, Laura Hering, Marcel Fafchamps, Anne Gielen, Sanjeev Goyal, Jurjen Kamphorst, David Laband, Sacha Kapoor, Marco van der Leij, Vincent Rebeyrol, Michael Rose, Dana Sisak, and seminar and workshop audiences for their comments. Special thanks to the many students who helped us as research assistants in the data collection and to the many editors, coeditors and editorial assistants who provided us with information about their journals. Financial support from Massey University and Middlesex University is gratefully acknowledged. We also benefited from research grant INFRAIA-2016-1-730897 through the EC Research Innovation Action under the H2020 Programme and the computing resources provided by SURFsara; and the State Research Agency (Spain) grant: PID2019-111708GA-I00/ SRA (State Research Agency /10.13039/501100011033). Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Granada / CBUA. We have no conflicts of interests to declare.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s)