Abstract
Along with the prevalence of photovoltaic (PV) procurement contracts, the corruption between auctioneers and potential electricity suppliers has attracted the attention of energy regulators. This study considers a corruption-proof environment wherein corruption is strictly suppressed. It elaborates a mechanism to explore the impact of corruption-proof measures on PV procurement auctions. It adopts incentive compatible constraints based on revelation principle to reflect PV firms’ optimal utilities. It employs first-price and first-score auctions and uses the Bayesian Nash equilibrium to provide a description of market outcomes. The results show that several strategies have different impacts on social welfare, PV firms’ utility, and the benefits of corruption. First, a first-price auction cannot act as a suitable policy because it may encourage corruption. Second, the first-score choice is desirable for social welfare to fit the forthcoming high-quality and low-price surroundings. Third, the first-score strategy maximizes PV firms’ utility and total income. The implications suggest that regulators ought not to employ first-price auctions in the future PV market from the perspective of social welfare. Another disadvantage of the first-price approach is that it enables the PV firm to maintain the utmost benefit from corruption.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 3441 |
| Journal | Sustainability (Switzerland) |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This research was funded by the General Project of the Humanities and Social Science Fund of the Chinese Ministry of Education “A study on optimization mechanism and policy coordination of power system grid source towards carbon neutral goal” under Grant No. 21YJA630023; the Major Project of the National Social Science Fund “Research on the path and collaborative mechanism of energy structure transformation under the ‘two-carbon’ target” under Grant No. 22&ZD104; Special Project of Policy Modeling and Strategy Research supported by National Dual-Carbon Strategy Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China Key project “Research on collaborative development optimization mechanism, dispatching strategy and policy of Smart Power Grid oriented to carbon neutrality” under Grant No. 72243009; National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 72171165, 72174141, and 71874121.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 by the authors.
