TY - JOUR
T1 - Which preferred providers are really preferred? Effectiveness of insurers' channeling incentives on pharmacy choice
AU - Boonen, LHHM (Lieke)
AU - Schut, Erik
AU - Donkers, Bas
AU - Koolman, AHE
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Efficient contracting of health care requires effective consumer channeling. Little is known about the effectiveness of channeling strategies. We study channeling incentives on pharmacy choice using a large scale discrete choice experiment. Financial incentives prove to be effective. Positive financial incentives are less effective than negative financial incentives. Channeling through qualitative incentives also leads to a significant impact on provider choice. While incentives help to channel, a strong status quo bias needs to be overcome before consumers change pharmacies. Focusing on consumers who are forced to choose a new pharmacy seems to be the most effective strategy.
AB - Efficient contracting of health care requires effective consumer channeling. Little is known about the effectiveness of channeling strategies. We study channeling incentives on pharmacy choice using a large scale discrete choice experiment. Financial incentives prove to be effective. Positive financial incentives are less effective than negative financial incentives. Channeling through qualitative incentives also leads to a significant impact on provider choice. While incentives help to channel, a strong status quo bias needs to be overcome before consumers change pharmacies. Focusing on consumers who are forced to choose a new pharmacy seems to be the most effective strategy.
UR - http://www.springerlink.com/content/y61h042k35ml3442/
U2 - 10.1007/s10754-009-9055-5
DO - 10.1007/s10754-009-9055-5
M3 - Article
C2 - 19242791
SN - 1389-6563
VL - 9
SP - 347
EP - 366
JO - International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics
JF - International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics
IS - 4
ER -