

## Chapter One

### A bird's-eye view of Rickert's philosophy

Before we turn to a representation and interpretation of Rickert's ideas and theories, based on a close reading of his texts, it might be helpful to summarize briefly the main components of his complex and at times rather abstract philosophical system. There is the happy circumstance that Rickert himself presented a couple of summaries of his ideas. To begin with, the first chapter of his 'General Foundation of Philosophy' explains the main lines of his idiosyncratic thinking. Secondly, two years before his death he published 'Fundamental Problems of Philosophy' which reads as a recapitulation of his philosophical system, and was obviously meant as an introductory text for lay-people. Finally, at the request of a philosophical periodical he wrote a brief summary of seven pages. This document was published again in 1982.<sup>1</sup> Although these publications have been helpful in writing the present concise summary of Rickert's thoughts and thinking, I shall allow myself a considerable amount of interpretational liberty. The succeeding chapters will follow Rickert's texts as closely as possible, but in this summary I shall for clarity's sake assume some distance from them. The following points, it seems to me, provide a concise synopsis of his philosophy.

(1) Rickert is not happy when his philosophy is branded 'neo-Kantian', obviously because he finds his philosophy of values and the related logic and methodology too original and authentic to be put into the context of an existing brand of philosophy. Yet, particularly in three aspects he remains a loyal follower of the great philosopher of Königsberg, namely (a) in the idea of a transcendental philosophy, (b) in the ongoing emphasis upon the distinction between form and content, and (c) in the epistemological conviction that reality outside human consciousness (*das Ding-an-sich*) is irrational and thus inaccessible for rational knowledge. Rickert calls this reality a heterogeneous continuum.

(a) His transcendentalism is primarily epistemological, but secondly also ontological. It has its origin in Kant's view that reality-in-itself (*das Ding-an-sich*), i.e. the world of facts, objects (including other living beings) and events can as such not be known. They constitute in that respect an 'irrational' mass of 'senseless' material. But human beings experience these objects through the sense-organs, these experiences are, as it were, structured first by the a priori forms time and space into a phenomenal *Anschauung* and next into a 'rational', intelligible order by the categories of the *Verstand* which function in man's consciousness prior to any experience. We order our sense-experiences in terms of here-and-there (space) and then-now-later (time). These experiences are next 'structured' by means of rational categories such as quality, quantity, causality, etc. which are also part of human consciousness prior to experience. This prior-to-experience of the concepts is called 'transcendental'.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. (1) Heinrich Rickert, *Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie I*, ('General Foundation of Philosophy. Vol. I' (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1921), pp. 1-49; (2) *Grundprobleme der Philosophie. Methodologie, Ontologie, Anthropologie* ('Fundamental Problems of Philosophy. Methodology, Ontology, Anthropology'), (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1934); (3) 'Thesen zum System der Philosophie', ('Theses on the System of Philosophy'), in: H.-L. Ollig (ed.), *Neukantianismus*, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982), pp. 174-181.

Because of this 'subjective' nature of the categories transcendentalism is often described in psychological terms, and because of its anti-realism (or anti-empiricism) it is identified with metaphysics. Rickert rejects both vehemently and consistently. Psychology to him is one of the empirical sciences which investigates the functions of the psyche, preferably in an experimental manner, but it cannot be the philosophical essence of epistemology, just as sociology or economics cannot assume such a philosophical position. Moreover, Rickert emphasizes cogently that philosophy is a scientific discipline which differs from the other (natural and cultural) sciences in that its object of investigation is not one specialized compartment of reality, as is the case with the different scientific disciplines, but reality-*in-toto*, encompassing, total reality.

(b) As in Kant's ontology and epistemology, Rickert sees concepts as formal, abstract, contentless 'categories' which must, as it were, be imposed on experienced contents in order to generate rational knowledge. This is, in fact, such a simple fact that we do not realize it in everyday life. After all, through the words and sentences of our language we impose on experienced realities categories which are in themselves empty (formal). The word 'tree' is quite general and abstract, but becomes concrete and specific when we apply it to a particular apple or cherry tree. By doing so, we in a sense put order on a reality which in and of itself cannot possibly be known. Through our language this chaotic mass is altered into a coherent, meaningful and valuable order. The sciences and in particular of course philosophy, repeat this procedure but now in a logically ruled procedure, called methodology.

(c) Rickert emphasizes the unbridgeable gap between reality and concepts, and therefore rejects the representational logic (*Abbildlogik*) and its inherent realism. Reality – the world of natural objects, historical events, psychological experiences, etc. – as we experience it through our sense-organs, does not contain and exhibit any sharp boundaries. It is, as he phrases it, a heterogeneous continuum. There are fluent transitions between everything that exists and occurs in reality. Not only nature, as an old saying has it, but also culture does not jump. Everything flows. This is reality's continuity. But there is still something else going on in reality: not one single human being, thing, or event is completely identical with someone else, something else or another event. There are at most some similarities between them. In other words, each component of reality has its own special, singular, individual character. Everything is different. It is reality's heterogeneity. Wherever we look, we will always find this combination of the floating continuity and the individual (special, singular) heterogeneity. This is why reality as a heterogeneous continuum may be called 'irrational'. If our concepts should represent this heterogeneous continuum, as the representational logic wants them to do, it would saddle them with an impossible task. In the language of everyday life, and more structured and logically ordered in the conceptual language of the sciences, we do not depict the complex heterogeneous continuum but, on the contrary, simplify and in a sense 'distort' it. We can only master it scientifically (i.e. rationally), if we separate the continuity from the heterogeneity, conceptually transforming the heterogeneous continuum into a homogeneous continuum on the one hand, and a heterogeneous discretum on the other. The former is performed by mathematics, the latter by the different (natural and cultural) sciences. As to the latter, it all depends on the point of view, where and how such a heterogeneously discrete segment is cut out of reality-*in-toto*, defining that specific segment as its proper object of research and concept formation. Rickert distinguishes two main points of view: the 'generalizing' and the 'individualizing' approach, respectively applied by the natural and the cultural sciences.

(2) Rickert then defends, to begin with, the thesis that philosophy ought to be both *scientific* (i.e. non-metaphysical) and *systematic*. That is, philosophy focuses, like the other sciences on empirical reality, i.e. the reality which we experience through our senses. The

scientific approach is also called by him ‘theoretical’, in contrast to the so-called ‘a-theoretical’ approaches of music, the arts, religion, eros.<sup>2</sup> Within the orbit of the sciences philosophy is not just a science among other sciences, but occupies a relatively exalted position, since its ‘object’ of investigation is reality-*in-toto*, unlike the specialized natural and cultural sciences which explore distinct parts of reality. Its aim is to construct concepts which refer to *das Weltall*, to total reality, not just to one specific, specialized part of reality. This, of course, needs a systematic approach. The concepts and their logically coherent theories form, as it were, a network which help us to know and understand reality not only rationally (i.e. logically and not just intuitively), but also systematically (i.e. not compartmentalized, as is necessarily the case with the specialized natural and cultural sciences). Reality-*in-toto* cannot be reconstructed by simply adding up the specialized scientific accounts of reality, and their specific philosophies. Neither does general, systematic philosophy come about by simply adding up the philosophies of various scientific disciplines, such as legal, social, economic, political, natural philosophy. That procedure would, of course, not lead to a philosophy with its own autonomy and authenticity, its own logical and methodological space among the other sciences.

Yet once more, philosophy is not just a specialized discipline alongside, or in the service of, other specialized sciences. It has, as has been remarked before, a relatively exalted position but that should not be interpreted in a Platonic or Hegelian sense. Rickert uses the following metaphor: philosophy is still the queen of the sciences, but the days of its autocratic reign are over; it reigns today as in a constitutional monarchy, i.e. in constant communication with the parliament of sciences. Philosophy, we may also say, is no longer the *prima donna* she was in former days, but a *prima inter pares*.

(3) This emphasis upon a *Weltall* and upon the concurrent need of a non-specialized, systematic philosophy sounds rather old-fashioned and quite *passé* today. However, this was already so in Rickert’s days, and he was fully aware of that! He singles out Nietzsche’s vitalism and Kierkegaard’s existentialism, and their manifold followers, as the main representatives of an anti-rational and anti-systematic ‘philosophy’. But the fragmented vision of philosophy is, he realizes, also fostered by the strong specialization of the various, natural-scientific as well as cultural-scientific disciplines each of which, if they are interested in philosophy at all, develops and promotes its own field-specific ‘philosophy’. In opposition to all this, Rickert sticks stubbornly to his ‘total’ and ‘systemic’ approach for two main reasons. First, if one sticks to the allegedly inevitable compartmentalization of philosophy in as many specialized philosophies as there are scientific disciplines, one must answer the question what it is that justifies the qualification of their being ‘philosophies’. Or, in other words, what is the genus of which these specialized philosophies are specimens? Second, to answer this question satisfactorily general philosophy needs to possess (a) its own object of investigation and (b) its own characteristic approach to this object. If the object cannot be a compilation of the specialized objects of the empirical sciences, it must be reality-*in-toto*. In order to be able to investigate this ‘total’ reality, it must be systematic. That may be old-fashioned, but the question is – also nowadays – whether it is logically unsound.

Rickert does realize that *Weltall*, reality-*in-toto*, is a rather problematic and hazardous concept. It smacks of Platonic metaphysics, i.e. the vision of an encompassing, overarching reality from which the empirical realities, with which we humans have to do and in which we live day by day, emanates. This is not at all what Rickert means by it. There are several passages in his writings which indicate that the envisaged reality-*in-toto* is a Kantian postulate

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<sup>2</sup> Rickert juxtaposes ‘theoretisch’ and ‘atheoretisch’ as synonyms of ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’. I translate ‘atheoretisch’ literally into ‘a-theoretical’ instead of ‘non-theoretical’. Similarly, throughout this book I shall use ‘ahistorical’ as a technical term instead of ‘non-historical’.

which one must stick to, in order to avoid the fragmentation of philosophical thought into many specialized philosophies. It is, in other words, more of an epistemological than an ontological and metaphysical concept. It is a fact, Rickert argues rather phenomenologically, that in our daily existence we do experience reality pre-reflectively as a whole, i.e. *in toto*, and thus not in the specialized terms of the various, compartmentalizing sciences. It is then the task of the philosopher to systematize and indeed rationalize this pre-reflective ‘totality’ of reality, but that does not mean that he has to get lost in the quicksand of metaphysics. What is at stake here is, of course, the philosophical status of the *Weltanschauung*, i.e. the worldview. There are, Rickert argues, many worldviews which are founded upon a particular component of reality-*in-toto* and then generalized into an encompassing, metaphysical status. Examples are Nietzsche’s ‘Life’, Kierkegaard’s ‘Existence’, Freud’s ‘Eros’, Bergson’s *élan vital*, etc. Rickert rejects the view of philosophy as just another metaphysical worldview, or even worse as an arbitrary compilation of existing worldviews. He rather sees his own philosophy of values as a *Weltanschauungslehre*, i.e. as worldview theory which reflects rationally and critically *about* human life. But this worldview theory, which constitutes, of course, an anthropology, does not offer a metaphysical, *normative* vision of what human life should be, or ought to be all about. This, incidentally, is one of the reasons why Rickert’s philosophy did not have the emotional appeal that Nietzsche, Bergson, or Heidegger exerted – and still exert today, we may add.

(4) The main aim of his philosophy is to acquire scientifically sound (‘theoretical’) knowledge of reality-*in-toto*. In this sense epistemology (closely linked to formal logic and methodology) has a primacy over ontology and stands apart from metaphysics. However, this is not to say that he does not engage in ontological reflections. On the contrary, his ideas about ‘reality’ are distinctly ontological. At the root of his ontology is the distinction between two kinds of reality, the sensible (*sinnliche*), explainable (*Erklären*) reality of the experiences and the non-sensible (*unsinnliche*), intelligible (*Verstehen*) reality of the meanings and values. (This runs, of course, parallel to the Platonic distinction of the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘understandable’ reality – the *aisthèton* and the *noèton* – or what Hume called the ‘sensible’ vis-à-vis the ‘intelligible’ reality.) Contrary to the persistent epistemological, Cartesian dualism of body-soul (or, in German, *Geist* which is usually used as an equivalent for psyche, or soul), Rickert argues that reality consists of three rather than these two dimensions: next to the sensible/observable corporeal reality, consisting of material objects, and the also sensible/observable psychic reality, consisting of psychic/conscious processes – both of which can be studied empirically and are open to causal explanation (*kausales Erklären*) – there is as a second realm the non-sensible, intelligible, understandable yet also ‘real’ reality of meaning (*Sinn, Bedeutung*) which are open to a different kind of knowledge which is usually called understanding (*Verstehen*). To give an example, men communicate by means of language. While speaking there are physical and psychic processes involved which can be studied empirically. However, the meaning of the words are non-sensible, yet very real. They are understandable, rather than empirically measurable. The linguistic meanings constitute an autonomous reality which is demonstrated by the fact that they can continue to exist and to be commonly understood even when there is no spoken or written expression anymore. We do not need any spoken or written texts in order to understand words like ‘water’, ‘bread’, ‘air’, etc. Rickert still adds the fact that the sensible world develops all the time, is in a constant flux. We observe, for instance, how a leaf is green in the summer and turns brown in the fall. However, the meaning of the word ‘green’ never flows over into ‘brown’. Words in our language have relatively permanent meanings, otherwise we would not be able to communicate at all. The meaning of the words for the three colors of the traffic lights cannot suddenly or gradually be changed into ‘red’, ‘white’ and ‘blue’.

Meanings are, of course, not limited to linguistic words. A facial expression, a glance of the eyes, a handshake, can often 'say more' than words. In a shared culture we do understand (rather than cognitively know) the facial and bodily gestures of our fellow men. They are an inherent element of our daily communication. Likewise, a serious disruption of communication may occur, if one is not acquainted with the meanings of gestures in a foreign culture. The very same argument holds true for non-verbal expressions such as those of music, the arts, religion, eros, etc. This again demonstrates the fact that meanings constitute an autonomous reality vis-à-vis the sensible reality of physical and psychic objects.

(5) There is an additional dimension or component of this non-sensible, intelligible reality of the meanings of words or similar expressions. Take theoretical (i.e. scientific) statements as an example. In order to be communicated at all they must, of course, possess an understandable meaning. However, we want the statement also to be true! That is, the value of truth (and its counterpart falseness) is involved. Meaningfulness and meaninglessness, sense and non-sense, are interlinked with values and counter-values. A scientific statement which is proven to be false is meaningless, and if it is true, it is meaningful. Likewise, non-theoretical expressions like music, the arts, religion, etc. contain understandable and communicable meanings, but represent simultaneously also values and counter-values. In other words, the non-sensible (*unsinnliche*) and understandable reality which Rickert distinguishes from the sensible (*sinnliche*) and explainable reality, consists of meanings and values. And there is an important difference between these two realities: the denial of the facts of the former results in nothingness, in non-facts and can thus be summarily discarded from our epistemological interest; the denial of values of the latter results in a counter-value which in history and society may well play a dominant role. Every 'god' encounters in this world somewhere and some time a 'devil' worshipped by people as a 'god'. It is the task of the philosophical theory of worldviews (*Weltanschauungslehre*) to describe and critically analyze these 'gods' and 'devils', but it cannot decide scientifically which 'gods' are legitimately to be demonized, or which 'devils' ought to be deified. That judgment is to be made by men in specific socio-cultural circumstances consisting of institutionalized 'meaningful configurations' (*Sinngebilde*). That is still another dimension of Rickert's theory of values, it is the judgment (*Urteil*) which in the end connects the abstract and formal values to the concrete and empirical contents of daily experience, and which likewise defines objects, processes and phenomena in the empirical reality of experience as being meaningful. For this judging activity Rickert employs the neologism *Sinnakt*, i.e. meaning bestowing act.

(6) Rickert has thus conceptually split reality in two 'spheres', the sensible, observable world of facts and objects and the non-sensible, understandable world of meanings and values. He cannot leave it at that because he is, as we have seen, in search of reality-*in-toto* conceptually 'covered' by a 'total' philosophy. There must be a third reality which reconciles the observable and the understandable realities. His ontology coincides at this point with his epistemology. Epistemologically, he argues, human knowledge consists of objects to be known and a subject that knows the objects. The German word for object is *Gegenstand* which means literally 'something standing opposite to something else'. Or phrased differently, a known object needs a knowing I. But this epistemological subject, the I of the knowledge process, cannot be the human psyche or consciousness because we can have knowledge of our psyche or consciousness which then is an object again, as is the case in the specialized scientific discipline, called psychology. It is equally incorrect to call this knowing I a metaphysical reality, because it is impossible to conceptualize such a metaphysical reality in a scientifically satisfactory manner. In fact, Rickert claims, this I, which Kant called a 'transcendental apperception' or a 'general consciousness' (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*), precedes

as it were each kind of sensible/observable and non-sensible/understandable objectivity, and can therefore be labeled as pro-physical rather than meta-physical. It is the immaterial and non-sensible subject, the transcendental 'pure Ego' which cannot be objectified, but functions as the original, pro-physical source of all knowledge. The I involved cannot be experienced indirectly, for instance by means of words, concepts or intuitions, but functions directly, neither cognitively nor emotionally, at the moment we set out to acquire knowledge of the sensible and the non-sensible reality.

(7) Rickert demonstrates here a *modus operandi* which is characteristic of all of his philosophizing. He called it heterothesis and heterology. It is a permanent thinking and arguing in terms of contrary, yet reciprocal concepts, i.e. conceptual alternatives which clarify one another and precludes a one-sided conceptual realism. The one is always defined in function of the other: transcendental I – experiential reality, subject-object, sensible/observable-intelligible/understandable, general-particular/individual, value-unvalue, natural-cultural, dead-alive, mechanical-organic, etc. It seems similar to the Hegelian dialectics, but is different in that the thesis-antithesis opposition is not 'solved' by a synthesis which is in its turn a thesis that calls forth its antithesis. Rickert does not 'solve' but maintains the tension and flexibility of the thesis-antithesis dualism, until he finalizes his philosophy in a metaphysical approach of reality-*in-toto*.

(8) The sciences, but also everyday living outside the world of the sciences, depend on digital judgments: 'yes' vis-à-vis 'no', 'positive' vis-à-vis 'negative'. Men can only make such digital judgments about reality or life in terms of values. In science and in daily life we are driven by interests and motives which are always related to certain values and meanings. There is, in other words, the anthropological and ontological fact of the value-relevance, or value-relatedness (*Wertbezogenheit*) of men which causes them to constantly relate to values (*Wertbeziehung*). However, there is also, Rickert emphasizes, a distinct difference between scientific and everyday life knowledge: the latter is intrinsically bound by values and their inherent norms, and therefore will always argue in terms of normative judgments like beautiful-ugly, kind-unkind, attractive-unattractive, etc., whereas the latter should at all costs refrain from such normative judgments, lest it violates the aim of an 'objective' analysis, explanation and interpretation of reality. Scientists are related to values through their interests, (thus, there is no 'value-free' science), but in their research, writing and teaching they should obey the scientific norm which tells them to operate 'free from value-judgments' (*wertungsfrei*), lest they explain their own, private interests and values and not the (natural-scientific) facts and (cultural-scientific) values and norms of the objects under investigation. Indeed, since the cultural sciences deal with meanings and values as their objects of investigation the norm of *Wertungsfreiheit* is of special importance. We have, meanwhile, left the realm of General Philosophy and entered the world of the empirical sciences which Rickert characterized in terms of a continuum of the Natural-Scientific approach versus the Cultural-Scientific Approach.

(9) In Rickert's ontology there is the distinction between the explainable world of the senses, divided into a corporeal and a psychic reality, vis-à-vis the understandable world of meanings and values – the one being *sinnlich*, the other *unsinnlich*. These two realities need, of course, different scientific approaches. Rickert rejects the traditional distinction of *Naturwissenschaft* (Natural Science) versus *Geisteswissenschaft* (Spiritual Science) since the latter easily leads to all sorts of vague connotations. *Geist* is connotated in particular with 'psyche' or 'consciousness' and may then easily lead to a psychologistic, i.e. metaphysical filling in of the idea of a *Geisteswissenschaft*. Rickert holds psychology in high respect but it

should be kept out of philosophy, since it is an empirical science which focuses upon the sensible reality of man's 'inner' experiences. (Rickert prefers to define psychology's methodology in natural-scientific terms, as in his days Wundt did in his experimental psychology. Other social sciences too, like sociology and economics, are viewed by him primarily in terms of the Natural-Scientific, generalizing, ahistorical approach.) The counterpart of Natural Science is, according to Rickert, Cultural Science (*Kulturwissenschaft*), i.e. the approach to empirical reality in terms of non-empirical, historical values, norms and meanings.

Natural Science and Cultural Science are usually distinguished in substantive terms of 'science of nature' and 'science of culture', the former investigating the value-free world of measurable, causally determined, ahistorical objects, the latter investigating the understandable world of historical values and meanings. 'Nature' in Kant's elegant definition is (liberally re-phrased) the 'world left to its own development', while 'culture' rather constitutes the 'world worked upon by men with their value-related interests and designs'. Rickert, however, is not really in favor of such a substantive differentiation of the two main groups of sciences. He rather distinguishes Natural Science and Cultural Science in the formal terms of two mutually quite different methodologies. Natural Science then is the generalizing approach to reality which searches for general and ahistorical concepts as the building blocks of general causal laws of development, whereas Cultural Science is the individualizing approach to reality which coins individual and historically grounded concepts which are the building blocks of interpretations of particular, individual men, events, and institutions. Particular facts or objects are for Natural Science just specimens of generic concepts. When these concepts have been formulated satisfactorily (in accordance with the demand of verification and/or falsification), there is no need any longer to search for and investigate more individual facts or objects. In Cultural Science historical facts and objects remain relevant for the ongoing research, since the values, norms and meaning to which they are related will change and develop in time. Newly discovered historical facts or events will also contribute to the re-formulation of the cultural-scientific concepts and theories.

Unlike the traditional dichotomy of *Naturwissenschaft versus Geisteswissenschaft*, Rickert's methodological pair of Natural Science and Cultural Science must be seen as constructed and therefore non-empirical ends on a continuum, which is the logical space wherein the empirical sciences operate – some very close to the Natural-Scientific pole of the continuum, like chemistry, physics, astronomy, etc., others operating at the opposite pole, like the historical discipline in particular. But most social sciences, like psychology, sociology, economics, etc. will operate somewhere in between the poles, sometimes close to the Natural-Scientific end of the continuum, as in behavioristic psychology or econometrics, sometimes closer to the Cultural Scientific pole of the continuum, like cultural sociology or institutional economics. The latter are usually active in historical and comparative analyses and interpretations, rather than in a search for exact laws of development. The conclusion of this methodological demarcation of the natural and the cultural sciences is that a conflict of methods (*Methodenstreit*) in the social sciences is logically unnecessary. It produces, as the history of these sciences has demonstrated, more noise than information.

(10) Rickert distinguishes, as we have seen, three different, yet interlinked realms (*Reiche*): first the observable (*sinnliche*) realm of facts, objects and events, investigated by the specialized research of the (natural and cultural) sciences; second, the understandable (*unsinnliche*) realm of values and meanings; third, the pro-physical realm of the transcendental Ego which functions, as it were, as the motor of the knowledge process. These three realms constitute ontologically the reality-*in-toto* which is the proper object of philosophy as a transcendental, systematic and scientific discipline, next to the various

empirical and specialized (natural- and cultural-) scientific disciplines. Yet, Rickert realizes, this ontology is still not really 'total' and not really 'systematic' since it still fragments the world into three components. What can be said about the fundamental anthropological quest for a meaningful life, for a coherent and overarching view of the world, of history and of the future – i.e. a worldview that offers an open and positive perspective on life and history? Or phrased differently, what is the logical status of a full-filled (*voll-ended*)<sup>3</sup> existence? These are no longer ontological reflections but clear-cut metaphysical yearnings which, however, may not be neglected, if one aims at a truly coherent and total vision of reality and history.

To sum up, metaphysics which Rickert carefully keeps out of his transcendental philosophy is at the end introduced as a kind of coping-stone without which philosophy would not be able to remain faithful to its mission of focusing philosophically on reality-*in-toto*. However, he wants to remain faithful also to the scientific nature of this total and systematic philosophy. These two motives exclude each other and there is no heterology that can solve this dilemma. As we shall see in Chapter Four, he takes refuge in the theory that metaphysics is epistemologically and ontologically indispensable as a *postulate* and that it can only be conceptualized by means of symbols, similes and allegories, not by theoretical, i.e. scientific concepts. Naturally, the *ideas* of Kant come to mind here. In any case, the metaphysical reality-*in-toto* thus presents an atheoretical reality, comparable to religion, ethics, literature, and the arts. This is a remarkable conclusion, because at the end of his ontological and epistemological journey Rickert's theoretical philosophy finds its fulfillment in an atheoretical, metaphysical Beyond, where knowledge is superseded by faith – an non-religious, agnostic type of faith.

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<sup>3</sup> Instead of the word 'fulfilled' I maintain Rickert's neologistic German concept 'voll-ended', translating it into 'full-filled'.