
Respondents report survey Public Private Partnerships

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Oktober 2014

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Content

1. Introduction	3
2. The Survey: design and respondents	11
3. Performance and innovation of outcomes	14
4. Trust in PPP: the crucial factor?	18
5. Characteristics of the PPP projects	20
6. (Hostile) media attention for the PPP projects	24
7. Contractual characteristics of the PPP projects	26
8. Relational governance	30
9. Characteristics of the networks around PPP projects	32
10. Managerial; strategies in the projects	36
11. Conclusions: lessons for PPP	40
References	41

1. Introduction

1.1. Public Private partnerships

Public private partnerships (PPP) have become a popular policy instrument in many Western European countries. Governments assume that the involvement of private actors in the provision of services, or in the realization of policy goals will increase quality and provide better value for money. It is believed that more intense co-production between public and private actors will generate better results. In the literature on PPPs, these benefits are typically referred to as ‘added value’ (Osborne 2000; Ghobadian *et al.* 2004). According to the literature in this area, the main characteristics of PPP are:

1. *Mutual coordination of activities and daily routines*: co-ordination is essential for any partnership, including public-private ones. The activities of the public and private organizations have to be well coordinated (Mulford and Rogers 1982; Hodge and Greve, 2005) or the desired exchange of information cannot be realized (Savas 2000).
2. *A level of shared risk and profit sharing is needed*: the co-operation between public and private actors has to result in at least some risk sharing, and if possible, in some level of profit sharing (Huxham and Vangen 2005). Authors point out that profit sharing does not always have to take the form of financial profits. It may be that the private actors have financial profits and the public actors get recognizable societal benefits from the co-operation, for instance a higher quality of service (Audit Commission 2003; Hodge and Greve 2005).
3. *A form of organizational arrangement between the partners to enhance the co-operation process* (see, for example, Savas 2000; Hodge et al, 2010). Most partnerships are structured around organizational arrangements that are meant to simplify co-ordination and secure the shared risk and profits. These arrangements can take the form of an informal project group, newly established consortiums or other hybrid organizational forms (Waddock 1991; Savas, 2000).

We can thus roughly define Public private partnership (PPP) as a “*more or less sustainable cooperation between public and private actors in which joint products and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared*” (Klijn and Teisman, 2003).

1.2. Why would PPP generate better outcomes

However whatever form of PPP we are talking about, the assumption that a PPP leads to better value for money and thus better outcomes can both be found in all the government documents (Kenniscentrum 2002; NAO 2002, ODPM 2002, 2004; Rekenkamer, 2013) as well as in the academic literature (Osborne 2000; Savas 2000; Klijn and Teisman 2003; Hodge and Greve 2005). In their evaluation of a PFI (a form of PPP see later text), established in relation to British schools, The British Audit Commission (2003) states that it provides: (1) better value for money; (2) buys services and not things; (3) provides better risk management; and (4) leaves a long-term legacy. We find the same kind of arguments in other countries, like The Netherlands (for details, see Kenniscentrum 2002; Rekenkamer, 2013).

In general, these outcomes related improvements can take several forms. The literature speaks mostly in terms of securing the same outcomes for lower costs (efficiency), or greater outcomes for the same cost (added value) (Kenniscentrum 2002). One could however add a third category of innovative solutions, or solutions that have not been achieved before (Borys and Jemison 1989; Hodge and Greve 2005):

- *More efficiency*: partnerships and the co-operation they engender result in lower costs and greater efficiency (Osborne, 2000; Savas 2000). One example of this is in the area of building projects where decisions might be made faster. Of course, more intense co-operation implies greater transaction costs, which should not exceed the possible revenues (Williamson 1996).
- *Added value*: public and private actors can add value to each other's performance because their efforts enhance the value of the product or service that is being delivered. The classic example is that of a co-operative effort of drafting a master plan for a newly built neighborhood that gives coherence to the total project, and thus raises the value of the individual dwellings.
- *More innovative results*: another often heard advantage of partnerships is that actors are able to realize better, more innovative solutions by harnessing each other's knowledge and expertise (Parker and Vaidia 2001; Huxham and Vangen 2005).

1.3. Organizational forms of PPP's

A wide variety of forms in which the PPP co-operation is used can be encountered. The forms range from strongly contractual forms, like the PFI contracts in the UK to more informal forms, like project groups without any formal judicial status and to tightly organized consortiums. The discussion on the choice of organizational form is fairly prominent in the partnership literature and even more prominent in the government texts about PPP (Nao, 2002; Kenniscentrum, 2002; 2004; Klijn 2009; Rekenkamer, 2013). And this is for instance also true for the discussion about Urban Regeneration Partnerships (Urban Task Force Report 1999, Kort and Klijn, 2011). However one cannot find definitive statements about which organizational form is the best for partnerships. The literature on PFI suggests that good and tight contracts seem to be the best. Of course the implicit assumption is that public actors have a clear idea about what it is they want to achieve and to thus to contract out. The

literature on URC's suggests tight partnership forms at arm's length from the government to be the best (Urban Task Force, 1999, 2005; VROM 2002).

A typology of public private partnerships

If we look at the wide variety of literature we see that the discussion focuses on the form of organization on the one hand (is the partnership organized in a strongly formalized form like a contract or a newly set up organization or not) and whether the relation between the public and private actors is more an equal (principle to principle) relation or more like a principle agent relations (see Osborne, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2005; Weihe, 2008). If we combine these two dimensions we get the table as presented in table 1. In each cell an example has been presented of the type of partnership that evolves out of the dichotomy.

Table 1: A typology of forms of PPP

Type of relation	A principle agent relation	Partnership relation (equal principle-principle relations)
Organizational form		
Tight organizational form	1. Design Finance Built Operate contracts (PFI like partnerships)	2. Consortium (like Urban Regeneration Companies)
Loosely coupled	3. Intensive general cooperation between public private actors (in policy programs for instance)	4. Network like partnership (intensive long time but organizational loose relationship)

Adapted from Klijn, 2010

When the form is tight and the relation has a strong principle agent relation we find ourselves in the DFBO contracts of the Private Finance Initiative in the UK. (cell 1). If we have a more principle-principle relation public and private actors jointly create and fund a separate organizational form like in the situation of the Urban Regeneration Companies we discussed earlier (cell 2). When the form is loosely coupled and the relation is a principle agent one we are talking about more general relations where public actors involve private actors to provide services or policy outcomes that match goals and aims of the public actors (Cell 3). Examples that have been mentioned here are for instance the relation between private schools and public actors, where public actors support private schools and private schools provide services that fit public goals (see for instance Weihe, 2008). This could be loosely contracts or implementation actions of private actors that fit in policy programs. One could question whether this really still belongs to the PPP category, because it is hardly a concrete partnership, but there are authors that do so (see the policy approach as discussed by Weihe, 2008). If we see a principle-principle

relation with a loosely coupled organization form we see PPP that have a network like character where there is mostly fairly intense interaction but only contract or organizational form when it comes to implementation activities (cell 4). This type of partnerships can be found in complex urban restructuring where public and private actors have intense interactions during a fairly long period of decision-making and developing and organizational form are only installed at the end.

Design Build Finance Operating and Alliance partnerships

The most well-known and used PPP models are the contractual or DFBO partnerships (type 1) and the consortium partnerships (type 2). So these partnerships will be dealt with more in depth.

In the first form of PPP the contractual character of PPP is stressed. The design, building, financing and commercial operation of an infrastructure project (such as a road, or a building like a school) are integrated into a contract (a DFBO contract). The added value lies in the lower costs of coordination between the various components (often expressed as 'efficiency' or 'value for money' gains). Even though these efficiencies are necessary for a PPP concession, they would not be sufficient to attract private or public sector interest. Their interest arises from the opportunity to create substantive added value. For example, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) tendering system used in the UK for the road construction bundles design, build, finance, and operation are contracted out to private consortia for a period of 30 years. The consortium can use more sustainable (expensive) building materials to save on future maintenance costs. The payment system rewards the 'availability' of roads (NAO, 2002; ODPM, 2002, 2004) rather than second-guessing the costs of constructing them. The opportunity for a long-term involvement in a project provides both the potential for devising new solutions to problems and protects a risk aversion to untested. Of course the essence of such a model is that the public actor can specify the goals at the beginning clear enough.

In the second form, separate activities are integrated to create added value. In this case, PPP is a consortium. This type of cooperation, usually involves the creation of a joint organization that coordinates the partnerships activities and is usually found in urban reconstruction and regeneration projects where measures to strengthen transport are combined with measures aimed at improving the living environment and/or housing and measures aimed at strengthening the economy. In this method of cooperation, added value is generated by combining substantive activities and projects which then reinforce each other. This also makes it possible to achieve a financial trade-off between profitable and less profitable but socially interesting components.

In these two forms of PPP, the method of co-production is regulated in different ways. In the contract form there is limited co-production between public and private actors. This primarily consists of interaction at the start of a PPP project regarding the basic principles of the project to be contracted out. This mode of co-operation is a variation on the classic method of contract allocation. Here, though, attempts are made to increase added value for both public and private parties through 'new forms' of contract relationship. The precondition for success for this type of approach to co-production is that the public party should be able to specify the problem (though not the solution, which would be the case in a 'traditional' contracting arrangement) and that clear rules for the tendering process exist (Klijn, 2002). The organizational cooperation constructions, or partnerships, model of PPP involves a far more intensive interaction because the various project components which are often the domain of diverse private and public actors have

to be coordinated. Moreover, it is more difficult to clearly delineate in advance the content and ambitions of the cooperation.

The difference in responsibility and risk division between the two forms is crucial. In a contract relationship there is a clear delineation of responsibility and risk and both ex-ante and ex-post negotiations will test that delineation. The commissioning party (the public party) is responsible for the problem/project specifications. After some co-production in the early phase (pre-contract negotiations), responsibilities are very strictly divided between public and private parties. Once the tendering process has been concluded the relationship is one of regulation. The principal (the public actor) monitors the behavior and actions of the agent (the private actors).

In a partnership the co-production is longer-term and more intensive since parties are also jointly responsible for the implementation. At the least, coordination is necessary because the parties' contributions have to be tailored to one another, and more joint product or policy development takes place. A comparison between contract partnership - in whatever form – and consortium partnership is illustrated in Table 1

Table 1 Co-production in PPP through contracts and consortium partnership.

Characteristics	Contract partnership	Consortium partnership
Type of relationship	Client (public party) and contractor (private party)	Joint decision making (searching for linkages)
Division of responsibility	Clear division (both in developing and in implementing projects)	Shared responsibility (in R&D activities but often during realization)
Specification of problem and solution	Public party specifies problem and solution/product	Public and private party involved in joint process of problem and solution specification
Scope of project	Tendency to search for clear divisions; any scope expansion must fall within the delineated responsibilities	Tendency to search for scope expansion and linking of elements
Preconditions for success	Clear contract and tendering rules and clearly formulated problems/project requirements	Linking ambitions and goals, effective rules for interaction to create commitment and profitable cooperation
Organizing principles	Separation of principal and agent, strict rules for tendering, competition during tendering, rules for judging outputs	Most important rules: joint rules for decision making, exit, conflict regulation, joint production and division of benefits
Management principles	Strongly based on principles of project management (specifying goals, organizing time planning, organizing manpower)	Based on principles of process management (searching for goals, linking and connecting actors' activities, and linking of decisions)
Information exchange	Strictly separated and used as strategic resource	Indispensable resource that needs to be shared
Pay off rules	Actors maximize their own profit (pay off rules separate profits of actors). Transaction costs are mainly made in monitoring agent and tendering procedure	Actors maximize joint benefit (pay off rules tie actors to each other). Transaction costs are mainly made in organizing process and exchange of information
Type of co-production	Limited and occurring primarily prior to the tendering process; after that only monitoring; no co-production	Extensive during the whole process; at first primarily regarding nature of ambitions and searching for linkages, later on more co-production in jointly realizing ambitions

Source: Klijn et al, 2007

1.4.Core ideas of PPP: what enhances partnership performance

But we not only see various forms of but we also see many different reasons why PPP's would be useful. In general policy makers and researchers assume that a more intensive cooperation between public and private parties will produce better and more efficient policy outcomes (the so called added value) and policy products (Savas, 2000; Ghobadian et al (2004); Hodge and Greve, 2005). The key 'partnership' mechanism is that private parties are involved earlier and more intensively in the decision making process, than is the case with more traditional client-supplier or principal-agent relationships. But the way this should be done and the assumption how this improves interactions and outputs are quite different in the available literature. This is due to the fact that the idea of public private partnerships is as we have argued earlier a hybrid idea (Kort and Klijn, 2011). One can find assumptions from two major theoretical perspectives in Public Administration: New Public Management and governance.

PPP as new public management arrangement: the characteristics of the contract

On the one hand one can recognize ideas from New Public Management that have become dominant in Public Administration since the eighties. In these ideas governments should focus on the formulation of public policy and leave the implementation to other bodies (private organizations or nonprofit organizations) (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). For that a separation of policy implementation and policy formation should be encouraged by privatization, outsourcing, agentification and a stronger emphasis on market mechanism and involvement of private actors (Hood, 1991). Public actors should control the implementation by performance indicators or market mechanisms.

One can clearly trace a number of these ideas in the public private partnerships debate where it stresses efficiency and tendering and outsourcing as possible forms of organizing PPP's (Nao, 2002; Hodge and Greve, 2005). This is especially strong in the literature on Private Finance Initiative in the UK which has so dominated the discussion on PPP the last 10-15 years. These ideas about efficiency, risk allocation etc. are clearly inspired by the ideas of the new Public management. But this can also be said about the suggestions that PPP should be given clear performance indicators and about the idea that we should organize PPP's in separate body's one could say at arms' length (Pollitt et. all, 2004). The idea of arm's length means that separate bodies are created at some distance of political institutions. Mostly distinction are being made between disaggregation (the degree of which a body is separated from political and governmental institutions) and autonomization (the degree to which these bodies have discretionary power to make independent decision) (see Pollitt et all, 2004). Arm's length enables managerial principles to be become more dominant in these bodies which will enhance efficiency and effectiveness (Pollitt et all, 2004). These arm's length bodies should be guided by performance criteria set before by political bodies. These ideas of separate arm's length bodies and performance indicators can both be found in the contractual PFI form but also in the idea of Urban regeneration Partnerships which have been mentioned in the previous section (Geddes, 2008). These Urban regeneration Companies are jointly initiatives of public and private actors and are used to develop but above all implement urban policies and restructure specific areas. Or as the Urban Task Force in the UK led by Lord Rogers state: *"The pace of regeneration could be increased if responsibilities for delivering area programs was placed in the hands of 'arm's length' organizations, owned by local partnerships. Urban Regeneration Companies could not*

only oversee work to completion, but also raise private finance and undertake direct development where necessary”(Urban Task Force, 1999).

PPP as governance arrangement: managerial effort crucial

However one can also recognize ideas in the PPP literature that resemble more the arguments that are present in the vast literature on governance. That literature on governance stresses the importance of horizontal coordination between public actors and other actors and the fact that it is difficult or impossible to revert to top down steering in a network society in which independence has increased because of specialization and knowledge spread and in which citizens emphasize voice rather than loyalty (see Sorensen and Torfing 2007; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

Governance literature emphasizes the complex nature of decision-making and service delivery, the dependence of other actors and the need for horizontal coordination and active forms of network management that promote cooperation between public and private actors, the generation of new innovative solutions and the use of knowledge among the actors and reduce veto powers and obstruction (see Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Sorenson and Torfing, 2007).

One can clearly also find some core element of the discussion on governance in the ideas on PPP. One can think of the assumption that co-production between public and private actors results in exchanging more information and the usage of each other's knowledge and so generate more innovative and better products and policy outputs for complex societal problems. Although the governance literature does mention organizational structure and form (Mandell, 2001) it tend to stress institutional and even more so managerial characteristics that are decisive for achieving good outcomes. Mostly these managerial efforts are labelled network management (Gage and Mandell, 1990; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Meir and O' Toole, 2007; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Without these managerial strategies reaching desirable outcomes is assumed to be very hard.

The governance literature would also emphasize that PPP projects are not developed and implemented in isolation between a public and a private partner but are affected intensively by the network of stakeholders that forms itself around a project. Thus managing that environment along with managing the project is crucial.

These managerial efforts are dubbed 'network management' (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Meier and O' Toole 2007). The literature on governance suggests that without these managerial strategies, it is difficult, indeed almost impossible to achieve desirable outcomes (for an overview, see O Toole 1988; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Klijn et al. 2010a).

The number of network management strategies that have been dealt with in the literature is impressive (see, for instance, O'Toole 1988; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001). It is clear, however, that if the network manager is to achieve significant outcomes, he has to implement a range of different strategies (see, for example, Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001). In general, one can make out four different categories of network management strategies: connecting actors, exploring content (creating more variety, organizing research, exploring the perceptions of different actors, and so on), arranging the structure of the

interaction (securing a temporary organizational arrangement for interactions) and establishing process rules (designing temporary agreements and rules to govern interactions) (for details, see Klijn et al. 2010a). The literature appears to stress the importance of these strategies, leading one to draw the conclusion that in general, networks and projects that employ a number of different strategies will achieve better results.

Some scholars approach network managers as individuals who have the explicit role or function to manage the network (see Meier and O'Toole 2007). However, management is not the act of one individual exclusively. Many individuals in the network may be performing management activities and different people may have impact on the interrelations between actors and the development of collaborations (Kickert et al. 1997). In other words, management is an activity that can be conducted by one or more actor working simultaneously. In the survey various items have been included to measure especially two types of network management strategies: exploring and connecting as these proved to be the most important in earlier research (see Klijn et al, 2010)

1.5. The survey: what is being researched

In the survey we explored several of the theoretical issues raised above. We looked at

1. The performance and innovative character of outcomes of PPP's as we would like to link these to several characteristics of partnerships
2. The contractual characteristics of the PPP projects; as we would like to analyse the relation of contractual characteristics with performance
3. Some characteristics of the projects that are said to influence the performance (the nature of competition with tendering, the technical complexity of the project etc.)
4. The managerial efforts that are put in the partnership project
5. Relational characteristics of the public and private partner (level of trust, the durability of the relation etc.)
6. The characteristic of the wider network around the PPP project

2. The survey: design and respondents

For the survey respondents were collected that are involved in known PPP projects in The Netherlands. For that we first looked at the projects that were mentioned in official government documents of the various ministries. We also received addresses from a few PPP advisory organizations like PPS support (a governmental organization that supports mainly local organized PPP projects). All in all we identified most of the known PPP projects and selected respondents from each organization involved by looking at websites and other information sources of the projects. The selected potential respondents were predominantly public and private respondents like respondents from private consortia that were selected, public officials involved in the projects etc.. In principle this survey thus is not a sample but represents almost the whole population (=people involved in official known PPP projects in The Netherlands).

Response of the survey

In total 343 respondents were selected and received a request to fill in the survey. We included as many respondents as possible since the average response for most surveys nowadays is about 30%. In principle more than one person was selected for each project (and a maximum of 3 respondents from each organization involved in a specific project). This was done to increase the possibility that a project was included in the response. This of course resulted that in some cases we have more than one respondent for a project.

Of the 343 respondents that were approached 10 respondents were not reached (mail undeliverable) and 24 respondents indicated that they would not like to fill in the survey or were not involved in the project. That leaves a total number of 309 respondents that were actually approached.



In total we received 157 people who responded to the survey. 13 people sent back the survey but did not respond to any of the questions. We deleted these from the number of respondents. This leaves 144 people who actually have filled in (parts of) the survey. This is a response percentage of 46,6% which is actually quite high. We think this percentage profits from:


1. the fact that we carefully selected people who are actually involved in PPP projects and thus also are interested in the possible results of the survey (we offered the possibility to send a report afterwards)
2. We sent three reminders
3. We actively answered people who asked questions and encouraged them to fill in the survey. Most of the time people after an e-mail exchange indicated that they would fill in the survey

Characteristics of the respondents


If we look at the characteristics of the respondents we can see below that the vast majority is male, relatively old (average 48 years) and experienced (average years of experience with complex projects 14

years).





In terms of the organization respondents work for we see three main categories: Public Organizations (respondents working at municipalities, central department, provinces or water boards), private organizations (construction companies, developers, banks etc.) and consultants. The first group is the largest as can be seen in the graphs below.




3. Performance and innovativeness of outcomes

We measured the performance of the PPP projects by several items (measured by a scale from 1-5):


- The content results in this project receive adequate support from involved organizations
- The various spatial functions in this project are sufficient connected to each other
- The solutions that have been developed tackle the problems at hand
- The content of the proposals are durable solutions
- The costs of the project stay within the limits that have been set
- The benefits of the projects- in general- exceeds the costs

The table below shows the scores for each of the items for the total respondents.



The items were related and factor analysis showed one emerging factor. Therefore we also created one overall scale for performance using the 6 items mentioned above. The scale had high reliability (Cronbach: 0.777). The scores of the overall performance indicator are shown below. In general the scores were rather high (close to 4 on a five point scale) indicating respondents were satisfied with the outcomes.


We also looked at the differences in performance judgments between the three groups of respondents but the differences was not significant, meaning that the three groups had on average the same opinion about the performance of the PPP projects.




We also had several items on the innovativeness of outcomes. One of the core items in the PPP literature is that PPP can lead to innovative products because private consortia are related in an earlier moment to the project. We measured project innovativeness by 5 items that were measured on a 1-10 scale:

- 1. In this project, compared to similar projects, no new innovative solutions were created (In this project, compared to similar projects, a lot of new innovative solutions were created)
- 2. In this project no new technology has been developed or is used in the realization (In this project much new technology has been developed or is used in the realization)
- 3. In this project various societal functions are hardly connected to each other (In this project various societal functions are strongly connected to each other)
- 4. The innovative character of the project is far below the expectations I had before (The innovative character of the project is far above the expectations I had before)
- 5. In this project we have developed no innovative ways of financing (In this project we have developed innovative ways of financing)

The average scores of the items are visualized below.



Item 3 and 5 were indications of the content of the project but not so much of the innovative character of the project. We expected the other three items to be related which turned out to be true. We used the three items as an overall indicator of innovativeness and the scores for the three groups of respondents on that overall score is presented below. As can be seen from the table there are some differences in the judgments of innovativeness of the project between the three groups of respondents. Respondents with a private background have a higher opinion of the innovative character of the projects than public actors, who have the lowest opinion, and consultants. An anova analysis shows that the differences are significant.




4. Trust in PPP: the crucial factor?

One of the factors mentioned often as important in partnerships is the existence of trust between the partners (see Huxham and Vangen, 2005). In this survey we distinguished between two types of trust: the trust between the (contractual) public and private partners and the trust in the whole network of stakeholders (thus including the public and private partners).

We measured the level of trust in the network by 5 items used in earlier research (see Klijn et al, 2010). The items, all measured on a 5 point scale (totally disagree-totally agree) were:

1. Agreement trust; the parties in this project generally live up to the agreements made with each other
2. Benefit of the doubt; the parties in this project give one another the benefit of the doubt
3. Reliability; the parties in this project keep in mind the intentions of the other parties
4. Absence of opportunistic behavior; parties do not use the contributions of other actors for their own advantage
5. Goodwill trust; parties in this project can assume that the intentions of the other parties are good in principle

The separate scores of the items are presented below. The scores formed a very good scale (Cronbach 0.851), so they were computed to form one scale on trust. Those score are also presented below. From those scores we can see that there are some small differences in the overall scores on trust in the network between the three groups of respondents but these differences were not significant (.667)



We also looked at the relation between trust and performance and innovativeness. The results of the regression analysis below show that trust between the public and private partners has a strong positive influence on performance. The same can be said of trust in the total network around the project. The effects on project innovativeness are also strong but less strong than on performance.

Dependent variable	Predictors	B	R square
<i>Performance</i>	Trust partners	.499***	.249***
	Trust network	.430***	.185***
<i>Project Innovativeness</i>	Trust partners	.336***	.113***
	Trust network	.335***	.113***

*** $p < .005$, ** $p < .05$


* $p < .1$

5. Characteristics of the PPP projects

In the survey we looked at several characteristics of the project that have been identified as important in the literature like the competitiveness, the margin between the cost price and the tender price etc.. The items we had in the survey, all had to be ranked in a scale from 1-10, were:

1. There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender process (There was much competition between providers in the tender process)
2. The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The project was characterized by high technological complexity)
3. The project was characterized by a low number of external stakeholders (The project was characterized by a high number of external stakeholders)
4. With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did not have earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did have already frequent earlier contacts)
5. According to me there is not much space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is contracted (According to me there is enough space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is contracted)
6. The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.)

The results for the individual items are presented below. We can see that according to the respondents the projects are in general complex: they are characterized by high competitiveness between providers, high technical complexity and many external conditions and the number of stakeholders is high. We will see this also when we come to the characteristics of the networks around the projects. In general we find lower scores for the space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is tendered. This score is right in the middle.ⁱ



If we look at the differences between the three groups of respondents only space between cost price shows significant differences between the three groups.

We also looked at the influence of each of these characteristics on performance, innovativeness of the project and trust. The results below show that the first item (competition between providers) has the strongest effect on performance but not innovativeness. The second characteristic technical complexity is the strongest related to project innovativeness which is not very surprising. In general technical complexity requires innovative projects. The technical complexity may even be the innovative character. These are also the two characteristics that have the most influence on the level of trust in the network. We also see a significant influence of another project characteristic: that is the space between the cost price and the sum for with the project is contracted. This has significant influence on the performance: more budget means better performance not surprisingly.

Dependent variable	Predictors	B	R square
<i>Performance</i>	There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender process (there was much competition between the providers in the tender process)	.331***	.258***
	The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The project was characterized by high technological complexity)	.147	
	The project was characterized by a low number of external stakeholders (The project was characterized by a high number of	.004	


	external stakeholders)		
	With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did not have earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did have already frequent earlier contacts)	-.088	
	According to me there is not much space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is contracted (According to me there is enough space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is contracted)	.184**	
	The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.)	.190*	
<i>Project Innovativeness</i>	There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender process (there was much competition between the providers in the tender process)	.082	.269***
	The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The project was characterized by high technological complexity)	.376***	
	The project was characterized by a low number of external stakeholders (The project was characterized by a high number of external stakeholders)	-.036	
	With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did not have earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did have already frequent earlier contacts)	.083	
	According to me there is not much space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is contracted (According to me there is enough space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is contracted)	.000	
	The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.)	.201**	
<i>Trust</i>	it There was hardly any competition between providers in the tender process (there was much competition between the providers in the tender process)	.207**	.105*
	The project was characterized by small technological complexity (The project was characterized by high technological complexity)	.237**	
	The project was characterized by a low number of external stakeholders (The project was characterized by a high number of external stakeholders)	-.157	
	With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did not have earlier contacts (With the (public or private) party where we cooperate in this project we did have already frequent earlier contacts)	-.020	
	According to me there is not much space between the cost price and the sum for which the project is contracted (According to me there is enough space between the cost price and the sum for which the project	.106	

is contracted)

The project is hardly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.) The project is strongly affected by external conditions (for instance like safety regulations, nature requirements etc.)

- .090

*** $p < .005$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .1$




6. (Hostile) media attention for the PPP projects

Another interesting question is whether the projects receive much and positive or negative media attention. Part of the literature emphasizes the rather technocratic character of PPP projects (Skelcher, 2005). For that we had 4 items in the survey one item asking the respondents whether there was much or little attention in the media for the project (on a scale from 1-10). The average media attention (answered on a question do you think this the attention of the media for this project is: very low attention –very high attention 10 point scale) is 6,37. So general respondents think there is quite some attention in the media for the project.

The other three items were used in earlier survey to measure the nature of the media attention (negative-positive; see Korthagen and Klijn 2014). The question asked to the respondents was: “The attention of the media for this project I would characterize as”: -positive-negative, accurate-full of mistakes and informative- sensational. Each of the items could be ranked from one extreme (1) to the other extreme (10) . The three items proved to form a good scale (Cronbach .718)

There are no significant differences between the three respond groups in their judgment about how hostile the media are. As one can see in general most respondents do not consider the media as very hostile to the PPP projects they are engaged. The average score is below the score 5 (which is in the middle of the positive –negative score).





If we look at the relation of (negative or hostile) media attention with performance, innovativeness and trust we see that it has a negative effect on all of these variables. Thus negative media attention is a pretty strong predictor for lower performance, less innovativeness and less trust.


Dependent variable	Predictor	B	R square
<i>Performance</i>	Hostile media attention	- .258**	.067**
<i>Project Innovativeness</i>	Hostile media attention	- .248**	.062**
<i>Trust</i>	Hostile media attention	.377***	.142***

*** $p < .005$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .1$

7. Contractual characteristics of the PPP projects

If it comes to the characteristics of the contract we first looked at whether there was a contract, the length of the contract and what was included (design, built, finance, maintenance and operate). As can be seen from the results below the lion share of the projects had a contract and the average length is about 20 years.






To measure the main characteristics of the contract we inserted 4 items (scored on a 1-10 scale) in the survey. They were:

1. The contract has no possibilities to impose sanctions in the case the contract is not abided (the contract has many possibilities to impose sanctions in the case the contract is not abided)
2. The contract is simple to understand (the contract is difficult to understand)
3. The contract is characterized by fixed target values and norms despite circumstance (the contract is characterized by flexible target values and norms that can reduced or enhanced under certain circumstances)
4. The contract offers very few space for negotiation (the contract offers many space for negotiation)

The figure below presents the scores on the separate items. One can see that average scores do not differ much from each other



If we look at the contractual characteristics and their effects on performance, project innovativeness and trust we can see that the strongest effect for performance can be found in the room for negotiation (more room relates to better performance). We also see effect of the comprehensibility of the contract on trust. Overall however most of the contract characteristics seem to have little effect. And the overall explained variance (the R square) is low. It is not at the contractual characteristics we have to look for strong explanations for outcomes of PPP projects despite all the theoretical attention to contracts and contract forms (like the emphasis on the importance of design maintenance and operating contracts).


Dependent variable	Predictors	B	R square
<i>Performance</i>	The contract has no opportunities to implement sanctions for non-compliance (The contract has a lot of opportunities to implement sanctions for non-compliance)	- .175*	.092**
	The contract is easy to understand (The contract is hard to understand)	- .127	
	The contract has solid goals and norms regardless of circumstances (The contract has flexible goals and norms that depend on circumstances)	- .045	
	The contract does not offer much room for negotiations (The contract offers a lot of room for negotiations)	.209**	
<i>Project Innovativeness</i>	The contract has no opportunities to implement sanctions for non-compliance (The contract has a lot of opportunities to implement sanctions for non-compliance)	- .139	.087**
	The contract is easy to understand (The contract is hard to understand)	- .173*	
	The contract has solid goals and norms regardless of circumstances (The contract has flexible goals and norms that depend on circumstances)	- .023	
	The contract does not offer much room for negotiations (The contract offers a lot of room for negotiations)	.192**	
<i>Trust</i>	The contract has no opportunities to implement sanctions for non-compliance (The contract has a lot of opportunities to implement sanctions for non-compliance)	- .137	.129***
	The contract is easy to understand (The contract is hard to understand)	- .229**	
	The contract has solid goals and norms regardless of circumstances (The contract has flexible goals and norms that depend on circumstances)	.296***	
	The contract does not offer much room for negotiations (The contract offers a lot of room for negotiations)	- .033	

***p<.005**p<.0

5* p < .1


8. Relational governance

There are various relational governance characteristics that are mentioned as important in the relation between the public and the private partners. In this survey we looked at some of the core characteristics. The figure below presents them.



As we can see in general the lowest score is for the level of sharing financial risks. The highest score is being given by the respondents for the level of involvement of private parties and the level of alignment of activities. The level of organizational facilities to facilitate interaction also scores high.

If we look at the contact frequency between public and private partners in the project there is in general a very high frequency (at least once a week)



Dep. variable	Predictors	B	Rsquare
<i>Performance</i>	Level of trust between public and private parties	.233**	.366***
	Level of involvement of private parties in content development of the project	.115	
	Level of sharing of financial risks	.084	
	Level of alignment of activities between parties	-.076	
	Level of organizational facilities to facilitate interaction between parties	.095	
	Level of common long-term and short-term goals between private and public parties	.214*	
	Level of people present that build and maintain sustainable relations with different organizations	-.071	
	Rise in level of trust between public and private parties	.228**	
<i>Project Innovativeness</i>	Level of trust between public and private parties	-.020	.298***
	Level of involvement of private parties in content development of the project	.242**	
	Level of sharing of financial risks	.057	
	Level of alignment of activities between parties	-.186*	
	Level of organizational facilities to facilitate interaction between parties	-.003	
	Level of common long-term and short-term goals between private and public parties	.090	
	Level of people present that build and maintain sustainable relations with different organizations	.357***	
	Rise in level of trust between public and private parties	.107	



*** $p < .005$,

9. Characteristics of the networks around PPP projects

PPP projects mostly take place in a complex environment where different stakeholders are trying to influence the project. We had several items in the survey where we wanted to get a picture of the network of actors around the project. We did this by asking a few questions on a 10 point scale (rankling from low to high). The first question we asked the respondents is how many actors were involved in the network around the project and after that the survey had three questions about core characteristics of the network:

- **Interactions: No interactions** between involved organizations in the network-**intensive** interactions between the organizations in the network
- **Differences of opinion: No big differences** in opinion between actors in the network about content and nature of the project- **big differences** in opinion between actors in the network about content and nature of the project
- **Interdependency: No interdependency** between organizations in the network- high **interdependency** between organizations in the network.


The figure below provides the information for the questions. As can be seen in general there are many organizations involved in the network. Some of the networks are very large (especially the relative large number of projects with more than 20 actors) while about half of the projects according to the respondents has only a moderate size (4-9 different actors). If it comes to the network characteristics of interactions, differences of opinion and dependency we can see that the scores do not differ very much and are all above the 5. Interactions are close to a score of a 7 on a 10 point scale.



We also asked for some specific characteristics of the decision-making process in which network actors are involved. The question asked was: how would you characterize the decision-making process in the network (scale from 1-10):

- No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process (intensive involvement of citizens in the decision-making process)
- No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of societal organizations)
- No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament etc.)- intensive involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament, etc.)
- Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-making is characterized by high transparency
- Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few unexpected events- Decision-making is unpredictable and characterized by many unexpected events

The graph below shows that especially the involvement of political bodies receives a high score and the involvement of citizens receives a relatively low score. Interestingly enough respondents do not find the process very unpredictable since this score is not very high (5,4 on 10 point scale). We could find no significant differences between the various groups of respondents.



If we analyze the relation between the characteristics above and performance, innovativeness and trust we can see several interesting relations. First of all transparency is positively correlated to performance and innovativeness. And is actually the only significant factor. Trust is however positively influenced by more of the characteristics (actually all besides the unpredictability are significant). The strongest is the involvement of societal organization and the transparency. Since

trust in itself has a positive effect on performance these characteristics then would have an indirect effect on performance. They enhance the level of trust and trust enhances the performance but they do not have a strong direct effect on performance.

Dependent variable	Predictors	B	R square
<i>Performance</i>	No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process (intensive involvement of citizens in the decision-making process)	-.073	.268***
	No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of societal organizations)	.068	
	No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament etc.)- intensive involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament, etc.)	.020	
	Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-making is characterized by high transparency	.5***	
	Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few unexpected events- Decision-making is unpredictable and characterized by many unexpected events	-.076	
	<i>Project Innovativeness</i>	No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process (intensive involvement of citizens in the decision-making process)	
No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of societal organizations)		.129	
No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament etc.)- intensive involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament, etc.)		.078	
Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-making is characterized by high transparency		.262***	
Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few unexpected events- Decision-making is unpredictable and characterized by many unexpected events		-.087	
<i>Trust</i>		No involvement of citizens in the decision-making process (intensive involvement of citizens in the decision-making process)	-.208*
	No involvement of societal organizations (large involvement of societal organizations)	.575***	
	No involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament etc.)- intensive involvement of political bodies (municipal council, parliament, etc.)	-.233**	
	Decision-making is characterized by low transparency- Decision-making is characterized by high transparency	.380***	
	Decision-making is predictable and characterized by few unexpected events- Decision-making is unpredictable and characterized by many unexpected events	-.124	

*** $p < .005$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .1$


10. Managerial strategies in the projects

In the survey we included 7 items to measure managerial activity in the project. The first 6 items were based on earlier research (Klijn et al 2010) and measured two types of network management strategies: connecting and exploring. The last item was more inspired by the literature on project management.

The items were

- 1. During information collection, emphasis was placed on establishing common starting points and common information needs between public and private parties in this project
- 2. Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors) and their opinions
- 3. In the decision-making process about the project different views are made visible and included
- 4. (private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of the project management
- 5. Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract parties as well as external parties)
- 6. When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, management tried to find common ground between the conflicting interests
- 7. There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-formulated aims of scope, time and money

As can be seen in the graph below the last managerial activity, the project management (item 7), is performed the most according to the respondents of the projects. This obvious is considered as 'business as usual'. The first and third activity, the development of common points of view and information needs and including different views are performed the least of all activities. There does not seem to be any large differences in the strategies used if we compare the various respondents



If we look at the effects of the managerial strategies on performance, innovativeness and trust again we see that especially strategy 3 (making different views explicit) 4 (consultation of implementing actors) but also 6 (searching for common ground) and strong project management have positive effect on performance. If it comes to project innovativeness other strategies (1 developing common starting points and joint information and 2, involvement of stakeholders) are important. And if we look at the level of trust it is again strategy 2 and 3 that are most effective to improve the level of trust.

Dependent variable	Predictors	B	R square
<i>Performance</i>	During information collection, emphasis was placed on establishing common starting points and common information needs between public and private parties in this project	-.040	.396***
	Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors and their opinions)	.081	
	In the decision-making process about the project different views are made visible and included	.304***	
	(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of the project management	.238**	
	Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract parties as well as external parties)	-.127	
	When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, management tried to find common ground between the conflicting interests	.261***	
	There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-formulated aims of scope, time and money	.201**	
	<i>Project Innovativeness</i>	During information collection, emphasis was placed on establishing common starting points and common information needs between public and private parties in this project	.230**
Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors and their opinions)		.224**	
In the decision-making process about the project different views are made visible and included		.071	
(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of the project management		.149	
Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract parties as well as external parties)		-.021	
When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, management tried to find common ground between the conflicting interests		.007	
There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-formulated aims of scope, time and money		-.062	
<i>Trust</i>		During information collection, emphasis was placed on establishing common starting points and common information needs between public and private parties in this project	.094
	Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors and their opinions)	-.041	
	In the decision-making process about the project different views are made visible and included	.342***	
	(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of the project management	-.009	

	Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract parties as well as external parties)	- .069	
	When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, management tried to find common ground between the conflicting interests	.113	
	There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-formulated aims of scope, time and money	.020	
<i>Hostile media attention</i>	During information collection, emphasis was placed on establishing common starting points and common information needs between public and private parties in this project	- .042	.122**
	Much attention has been paid to the involvement of external stakeholders (citizens, environmental groups, other public actors and their opinions)	- .174*	
	In the decision-making process about the project different views are made visible and included	- .175*	
	(private) implementers are consulted and involved in decisions of the project management	- .066	
	Much time is spent in communicating between parties (contract parties as well as external parties)	.023	
	When deadlock was reached or problems arose in the project, management tried to find common ground between the conflicting interests	- .017	
	There is a strong focus on realizing of the project within pre-formulated aims of scope, time and money	- .098	

*** $p < .005$

** $p < .05$

* $p < .1$

11. Conclusion: lessons for PPP

Public private Partnership project in The Netherlands are complex can be concluded from this survey. Many projects include between 5 and 10 different involved parties. But there are also many projects that include 20 or more parties. The projects in general show more involvement of political bodies according to the respondents than of citizens and societal actors. Respondents also indicate that in general the project was characterized by a high number of stakeholders, technical complexity and that the project was affected by several external conditions difficult to influence. Thus if there is one clear conclusion that dominates the results of this survey it is the acknowledgement that these are fairly complex projects.

Respondents in general rank the performance of these projects as relatively high (close to a 4 on a 4 point scale). They are more satisfied about the adequacy of the solutions and the content of the proposals than the costs and benefits (although these still are a little above 3,5)

The most striking conclusion is probably the limited effect of contract characteristics on performance. This contrary to the wide literature on PPP's that tend to lay much emphasizes on contractual characteristics. But in our survey we do not get spectacular results from contractual characteristics. There is some relation between the room for negotiation and performance but the relation is not very strong. And the overall explained variance is not very high. So practitioners probably should not expect too much for improvement of performance from contract characteristics.

Trust on the other hand both between the contract partners and in the network of involved stakeholders as a whole seems very important. Trust between the partners then as it turns out in this survey is then more important than trust among actors in the wider networks. Given the types of respondents (people involved in the projects) and the types of projects (most of them DFBM contracts of some kind) this is not surprising. Along with trust managerial efforts are strongly related to (perceived) performance of PPP's.

Thus trust and managerial effort seems to be the strongest predictors of good performance according to our survey. This is in line with earlier research (see Steijn et al, 2011, Kort and Klijn 2011) which emphasize the importance of managerial strategies over organizational arrangements.

The complexity of the projects, which we mentioned at the start of the conclusion, probably is the reason that contract characteristics are less important than trust and managerial effort. If projects are complex and show unexpected developments it is difficult, and probably impossible to foresee this in contracts that are written before the project starts (at least in terms of implementation). Complexity then has to be addressed by trust between the partners and managerial effort to solve the newly emerging developments and problems. The moment partners need the contract to solve their problems the project probably is already in danger. So that is the second main lesson for practitioners: do install organizational forms and contracts but do not expect them to lead to good performance. That is secured by building trust relations and putting in enough managerial efforts to stimulate coordination between partners, deal with a complex environment and buffer unexpected events and developments

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ⁱ De Standard Deviation of the items is 2,4 (item 1), 2,06 (item 2), 2,1 (item 3), 2,9 (item 4), 2,5 (item 5), 2,2 (item 6)