

DIASPORIC VOLUNTEERING IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: IS FAITH-BASED MORE EFFECTIVE THAN SECULAR PHILANTHROPY? A CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS AND MOROCCO

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Cross-border diasporic philanthropy has been studied over the last couple of decades. Several studies have demonstrated the impact of diaspora groups in Europe supporting their family and community members in their home country through the act of remittances. As diaspora groups often exist in countries with a post-colonial history, countries who do not share such history are rather absent in these studies. The Netherlands and Morocco are examples of such. This study contributes to the literature on cross-border diasporic philanthropy in cross-national context of countries with no colonial past, but with a diaspora present in both societies. Through empirical research, done between 2016 and 2021, the perspectives are summarized and presented of three distinctive groups: the Amazigh diaspora living in the Netherlands, the Amazigh diaspora living in Morocco and the social groups finding themselves on the receiving ends of the philanthropy done by the first two groups. This study presents how both diasporic voluntary

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DOI: 10.2979/muslphilcivisoc.5.2.06

groups, both paid and unpaid, are criticizing the other (diaspora voluntary group) together with how post-colonial behavior is experienced by the receiving end. This study reveals both religious and secular motifs within the national and international Moroccan diaspora, stating that religious motifs as more effective than the first. This leads to the main argument answering the question in the title of this article, along with a possible explanation of the existence of this phenomenon and elevation for its solution.

Key words: diaspora, cross-border philanthropy, faith based vs secular, urban vs rural, sense of belonging.

Introduction

Morocco's unique geographical position and its large scale of diversity, makes the country an interesting case when examining human aid and philanthropy. This is especially the case, since both Africa and the MENA (Middle East North Africa) have been a constant objective of aid performed by Western civil actors (Fowler, 2021). However, it is important to keep in mind that Morocco is part of both geographical regions: Africa and the MENA. Following the earlier statement of Fowler (2021), it would be interesting to examine whether philanthropy and volunteering within the borders of Africa and the MENA is different, or not. As the MENA is often referred to as the Islamic 'Arab' world (see Gerges, 2019), important concepts, such as ethnicity, cultural and religious identity, the form of state and the belonging governance, the civil society and so on, are immediately included when researching one particular country. This complexity grows as the latter appears to have strong international bounds with volunteering and philanthropy as important fundamentals. In the case of Morocco, research has shown that volunteering and philanthropy are mostly done by its own diaspora living abroad (see Mahieu, 2020).

However, before further discussing the importance Moroccan diaspora embody for their country of origin, it is necessary to further elaborate the position Morocco holds within the Islamic world. As stated by Contreras et.al (2015, p. 113), "it is not an easy venture to track down religion in the context of Morocco today and to understand the mechanisms by which religion makes itself manifest in the country and abroad. An attempt to understand the characteristics of Islam in Morocco has motivated studies in the social sciences since before the country's independence". As Geertz (1968, p. 20) noted "that the key is to

recognize “the material reasons why Moroccan Islam became activist, rigorous, dogmatic and more than a little anthropolatrous”. Geertz tried to understand and explain Islam in Morocco as a cultural whole homogenized over time by the contact between rural tribes and city dwellers”. However, Westermarck wrote “that in their religious practice, Moroccans endeavor to benefit by the *baraka* (gained religious favor) and to escape the problem” (Contreras, 2015, p. 113).

The extent to which these statements characterize the relationship between Moroccans and religion in their practices today was analyzed with a survey of 1,156 people (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007). In terms of religious practice, “15% of Moroccans say they never pray and only 16% go to the mosque to do so (only 2% of women). The level increases with age (using morning prayer as an example, 9.8% of 18-24 year-olds practice it, compared to 57.6% of people over 60)” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy 2007, p. 51-55). “Despite the proliferation of practices like pilgrimages and religious festivals, pilgrimage seems to attract increasingly fewer Moroccans” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 61-62). “Young people are more active practitioners than before, although this is seen in conjunction with religious and political fervor at a time of tension with the West—referring to Northern America and Western Europe. The common use of specific religious vocabulary among young people reveals a generational and ideological break and a greater understanding of their religion, indicated by 56.7% of the survey respondents” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 75). “Religious knowledge is trending upwards, not only among the well-educated, with their scripturalist explanations of religion, but in general. Simple practice no longer appears to be sufficient; rather, there is a growing interest in knowing religious history and doctrine better, caused by the political involvement of Islam in e.g. the war on terror” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 97). Interestingly, the study also offers empirical data about the secularization of Moroccan society.

“Moroccans increasingly support separating religion and politics: 41.5% believe that politicians should not be involved in religion and that ‘ulama’ should not be involved in politics (35.4%), although 25.2% believe the opposite” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 82). Additionally, “an important number of the survey respondents say they have no opinion about the matter. After the 2003 Casablanca attacks and subsequent events, part of the population became disinterested in questions related to Islam and politics because it could lead to ‘useless tension’” (Contreras et al., 2015, p. 113). This is striking as Contreras et al. (2015) present “the religious component in the upbringing of Moroccan diaspora in the West as one of the most important aspects” (p.

113). This will be further elaborated in the discussion section below, in which I present my data.

However, as this study mainly focuses on the diaspora present in the Netherlands, the context of Europe is important to mention in the introduction as well. The Dutch Moroccan diaspora is currently “one of the largest and most dispersed migrant population. Over the last century, large diaspora communities have settled in France (1,146,000), Belgium (298,000), the Netherlands (363,000), Italy (487,000) and Spain (766,000) and smaller ones in many other European countries, including Germany (127,000)” (De Haas, 2014). These migrant populations, “currently estimated by the Moroccan government at five million worldwide (about 15% of the total Moroccan population), contribute in various ways to Morocco’s economy and society” (Mahieu, 2020, p. 231). Most notably, “there is an annual remittance flow of around \$7 billion (through official channels only). Remittances are the second source of hard currency after tourism receipts, which are also, to a large extent, provided by expatriate Moroccans during summer holidays (MPC, 2013), as more than two million Moroccans return every year during holidays. Because of this significant financial input, the Moroccan population abroad is often depicted as the “cash cow” of Morocco. Many also own houses in Morocco, and at the community level, numerous small-scale non-governmental initiatives improve general welfare and contribute to local development in Morocco” (Mahieu, 2020, p. 231).

While the Moroccan population abroad grew throughout the 20th century, along with the flow of remittances and forms of cross-border philanthropy such as orphanages being built by collected money by the diasporic community, the country itself went through many internal changes. Social movements which started right before the country’s independence in 1956, resulted in a national civil society in which national NGOs became the most important actors. These were often managed and guided by elite Arab-speaking women, living in the big city of Casablanca and Rabat (see Sadiqi, 2012). No denial can be made about the importance of the outreach role these actors played in the civil field of Morocco. However, as it is clear how much the Moroccan diaspora population contributes to the country’s development in valuta, it is fair to make a comparison between the diaspora and the country’s own civil society organizations (CSOs, see Fowler, 2021). The available scientific literature within the field of philanthropy and transnationalism has emphasized several flows of voluntarism and philanthropy between different continents, countries and ((non)-religious) communities. However, it is to the best of my knowledge that little of the existing

literature compares local and cross-border philanthropy. In addition to that, little research has focused on cross-border philanthropy between countries with no or little (post-colonial) history, such as the Netherlands and Morocco. This compared to countries who do share a colonial past along with a diaspora performing cross-border philanthropy (e.g. Pakistani-English diaspora in the UK (see Werber, 2019)).

Thus, if Morocco's diaspora is described as the country's 'cash cow', the question one can raise, and therefore the challenge for this study is: how does diasporic cross-border philanthropy, coming from a country with no colonial past with Morocco, affect Morocco's civil society, compared to the philanthropy that is done locally? The importance, or influence, of religion (e.g. faith based giving, *zakat*, *sadaqah*, *waqf*) is left out in this observation, but will be included in the discussion section below. It is in the same section where the question mentioned in the title will be further discussed.

Heterogeneous Moroccan diaspora in the Netherlands

Europe's need of cheap labor after the Second World War has been an important driver for Morocco's post-war emigration (Charef, 2014). Morocco's signing of a series of labor treaties with European states during the 1950s and 1960s can be put forward as the decisive factor of twentieth century Moroccan emigration. Mahieu (2020) argues that, "while the initial labor migration wave was primarily low-skilled and male-dominated, this unidimensional picture should be nuanced in at least four ways" (p. 231).

First, "the presence of Moroccans in Europe is older than post-war migration, including Moroccan soldiers' participation in the World Wars. Second, Moroccan emigration has always been motivated by other than strictly economic factors, such as political repression under Morocco's authoritarian regime following independence. Third, after the abandonment of the labor recruitment treaties in 1973, Moroccan emigration continued, albeit in different shapes. Other types of Moroccan migration emerged such as (female) family reunification, student migration, high-skilled migration, marriage migration, etc., thus adding to the diversity in the Moroccan expatriate population. Fourth, the Moroccan population abroad has expanded geographically to an increasing number of destinations. Initially, the Moroccan labor migration went to France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (the four countries that had signed a labor treaty with Morocco). Among these, France was the primary destination, with population movements

being anchored in the status of Morocco as a French protectorate until the Moroccan independence in 1956” (Mahieu, 2020, p. 231).

However, De Haas argues that the Moroccan migration to a specific region in Europe is dependent on the region of the Moroccan migrant in their homeland (2001). Adding that “these patterns seem to be partly reproduced and reinforced by migrant networks. The northern Rif Mountains, the southwestern Sous area, and the southern river oases located in the pre-African fault between the Saghro and High Atlas (mainly Dadès, Todgha, Ferkla), have been the earliest and most renowned “expulsion zones” of international migrants” (De Haas, 2003, p. 112). “The provinces with the highest international migration rates are Agadir (Sous), Ouarzazate (which comprises most oases), and the northern provinces of Al Hoceima, Nador, and, to a lesser degree, Oujda”, Refass added (1990, p. 228). “The Rif, the Sous, and the southern oases form the principal ‘migration belts’, where ancient traditions of internal, largely circular and seasonal labor migration have been continued, extended, and transformed in the twentieth century following colonization, state formation, and modernization” (De Haas, 2003, p. 112).

According to Bencherifa, “several factors explain why international migration has predominantly occurred from these regions. First, it has been argued that Morocco’s most intensive out-migration has typically occurred in rural regions characterized by low rainfall” (Bencherifa, 1996, p. 404) and “high population densities in relation to limited agricultural resources” (Fadloulah et al., 2000, p. 53). Nevertheless, De Haas adds “that it should be mentioned that these areas—with the possible exception of parts of the Rif—are not among the most rural in Morocco” (2003, p. 112). For instance, “oases that have heavily participated in international migration are relatively prosperous oases located in fertile river valleys. More peripherally and agriculturally marginal oases (e.g., the Bani and mountain oases) tend to be far less involved in international migration” (De Haas, 1998). Second, “the fact that these regions had already established ancient traditions of circular migration within Morocco and to Algeria appears to have greatly facilitated their participation in new forms of rural-to-urban and international migration to Europe. Third, recruiters and employers in Europe generally preferred illiterate people, as they were seen as hard working, non-plaintive, and not prone to “subversive” activities such as trade union membership” (Obdeijn, 1993; Reniers, 1999, p. 684). Finally, “the Moroccan government actively stimulated labor recruitment from these regions. It saw migration as an instrument to decrease tensions in these poor, generally Amazigh speaking, rural areas,

which had a rebellious reputation vis-à-vis the power of the predominantly urban, Arab-speaking governance. This was particularly the case for the Rif, where violent rebellions had occurred on several occasions before and after independence” (Obdeijn, 1993; Reniers, 1999, p. 684).

According to (Fadloulah et al., 2000, p. 51), “nowhere else in Morocco is migration as rooted in social life to the same extent as in the northern Rif Mountains and the surrounding areas.” “The Rif was among the first regions to participate in labor migration to France in colonial times, mostly via Algeria” (Heinemeijer et al., 1976, p. 90). “Direct migration to France and internal migration to central Morocco was limited, however, as the north was part of the Spanish protectorate, and therefore had developed little links with central Morocco and France. As of the late 1950s, the Rif entered a period of deep economic crisis, caused by little to no economical and societal investments from the government. This resulted in a rebellion against the Moroccan state in 1958-1959. After the definite closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border in 1962 following political-military tensions between the two countries, new migration destinations were increasingly explored in northwestern Europe” (Heinemeijer et al., 1976, p. 90), where high economic growth led to an increasing shortage of unskilled labor.

Demonstrated by Haleber, “since the 1960s, the Rif Mountains and surrounding areas in the north have concentrated on migration to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. The large majority of Moroccans in those three countries are from the north. For instance, more than three quarters of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands originate from the Rif mountains (provinces Nador, Al Hoceima, Taza, Chaouen and Tétouan) and the region around Oujda and Berkane (Maroc oriental)” (De Mas 1990b; Haleber, 1990 p. 139). Adding that “France is also an important destination, but less than in other regions, which can partly be explained by the absence of historical colonial links” (Haleber 1990, p. 139). In France, there is a larger community with roots in the area of Ouarzazate and the Atlas region. The separation in regions to which Moroccans immigrated, has had an immense impact on the way diaspora correspondents referred to their philanthropic behavior towards the country of origin. The relationship between the home country and the countries in which diaspora are resident, is therefore important to mention, as there is no colonial past between the Netherlands and Morocco like there is between France and Morocco. Therefore, the human aid in forms of volunteering and philanthropy between the first two is based on a different kind of diasporic behavior. How this is less post-colonial, or more, is discussed in the section ‘discussion’.

Again referring to the amount of remittances that Moroccan migrants commit towards their home country, the important question that should also be raised here is the diaspora's sense of belonging (see Bouras, 2012). According to Contreras et al. (2015), "the Moroccan state has created a transnational field of action over the last twenty years that fosters a sense of belonging among those living abroad. Transnational spaces have been developed not only where migration flows and where entries and exits are managed, but also where the identities, sense of belonging, and unique forms of citizen development, that are part of progressively more intricate international relations, are negotiated" (p. 113). These 'diaspora policies' consist of an array of measures, including: ministerial and consular reforms, investment policies to attract remittances, the extension of political rights (dual citizenship, the right to vote from abroad), the extension of state protection or services and symbolic policies. They are all meant to reinforce a sense of belonging (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003). Besides, many first generations migrants kept their initial plan alive, which was to return to their homeland. Even after the second generations found its way into Europe's daily life. Meaning, becoming part of its education system (Bouras, 2012). This resulted in a complete generation growing up in one continent, while being told by their home base that the plan for the future remains in Morocco. As stated earlier, besides the geographical importance of Morocco, religious aspects were very much present in this upbringing. However, "with ancillary material elements of worship, the inclusion of religious content in classes on the language and culture of origin for diaspora of Moroccans and the creation of a symbolic language of belonging to a community is defined by religion" (Contreras et al. 2015, p. 113). This explains the importance of Islam and the Islamic identity within Moroccan diaspora communities outside of Morocco (see Werbner, 2012), and the visible contradiction with the country of origin. Though the official state and law is partly based on *Sharia* (Islamic law), the rest is still based on the French legal system which was implemented in 1912 (De Haas, 2003).

Methodology

For this paper, data has been conducted through a qualitative method with three different groups: the Amazigh diaspora living in the Netherlands (N=35), the Amazigh diaspora living in Morocco (N=30), and the social groups finding itself on the receiving ends of the philanthropy done by the first two groups (N=45). The first two have been interviewed between 2019 and 2021 and the third between 2016

and 2021. The first group of respondents contained five Dutch non-profit organizations with an overall of 30 diasporic Moroccan volunteers and whose philanthropy takes place in Morocco. The second group of respondents contained five Moroccan non-profit organizations who are located in the capital city of Rabat with 25 volunteers. And the third contained Moroccan citizens who are on the receiving end of the philanthropy and volunteering by both the first two focus groups. They are located in both the urban and rural areas. Through semi-structured interviews, the aim has been to generate in-depth ideas, motives and opinions from first hand observers. This was the case on both the giving end as it was on the receiving end of this form of philanthropy. The comparison between the groups on the giving end leads to either confirm or reject the hypothesis in which it is argued that, an Islamic civil society, such as Morocco, is served best by cross border diasporic philanthropy only when it is driven by faith.

Results and analysis¹

(Be)longing to the motherland

Surveying diasporic philanthropists and volunteers in the Netherlands between 2019 and 2021 shows that the Islamic component in diasporic cross-border philanthropy and volunteering does not serve as the only motive. Some participants even denied the presence of it in their strategy², though they used Islamic terminology in their marketing on social media. They also added that the Islamic identity as a Muslim is important to themselves privately, but not in their philanthropy. At the same time, the combination of a sense of belonging and Islamic morality resulted in a growing diasporic group of volunteers in the Netherlands. Who, according to one of the participants, mainly use their Moroccan Amazigh ethnicity to fill the needs of Morocco's lower social class. The latter has always been associated with the country's isolated, rural, Amazigh groups. One of my arguments is that the philanthropic outreach of this group of cross-border volunteers tends to be more effective than Morocco's domestic CSOs, due to the use of their cultural identity. However, it must be mentioned that the argument demonstrated in this paper is only valid if the experience of the receiving end is considered as

¹ All names used in this section are not real names of interviewees, but pseudonyms to protect their privacy.

² Due to the privacy of the interviewed philanthropists and volunteers, the websites of the organizations, in which the strategy can be analyzed, is not included.

leading. All volunteers in the five Moroccan diasporic organizations in the Netherlands (N=35) have roots in the Rif areas. This means that the upbringing was defined by religion but not only. As earlier stated by de Haas (2003), Moroccan migrants came from several regions. Due to the cultural diversity of Morocco, we can state that Moroccan migrants cannot be approached as one culturally homogenous group. There is an obvious separation between Arabs and Amazigh³ groups, which can be recognized through language, norm and values, and geography, as most Amazigh societies are located in rural, isolated areas (see Sadiqi & Ennaji 2012). Corresponding with state officials, before the Amazigh language (Tamazight) was considered an official language in 2011 (see Sadiqi, 2018), remained a challenge. One of the respondents, a doctor who performs medical care through a diasporic Dutch organization, specifically pointed at linguistic differences between medical care workers and citizens:

Every time my team and I travel to Morocco for another mission, I become aware of this huge bridge that should constantly be built between the officials and the patients. This is both the case in the Rif region as it is in other regions where the majority does not speak Arabic. Though I don't speak every Amazigh language, I do speak the Riffian language and Darija.⁴ So the translation is always covered by me.

When following up on his embodiment of a linguistic bridge by questioning its fundament, the motif was in line with 100% of my participants. Meaning: every Dutch-Moroccan volunteer who participated in this research admitted being a linguistic bridge between state officials/authorities when performing their philanthropy in Morocco.

Our parents couldn't help our home country the way we can today. We are educated, we have our connections outside of our families, so we can do more than just send money.

³ A tribal ethnic group who are considered Morocco's indigenous people. Amazigh literally means 'free people'. Decedents of this ethnic group are known as Imazighn, or Berbers, and are considered to live in communities scattered across Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Libya, Egypt (in Siwa), Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (Chaker 1998:14).

⁴ The Arabic dialect spoken in Morocco and Algeria.

Referring to Morocco as their home country immediately refers to the importance of the diasporic sense of belonging in their act of philanthropy and volunteering. Questioning why they do not perform the same type of philanthropy in their country of residence, the Netherlands, led to references to social governmental care. Added by another volunteering medical doctor:

The way our insurances work here in Europe is just not the same as it is in Morocco. Sure there are doctors and officials to rely on, but there is still a lot of money needed and the origins from a certain social class, to provide for these specific resources. People in the rural villages, not just in the Rif area, are suffering and I feel responsible. Not just as a doctor but also as a human being, as someone with roots in those same mountains.

Referring to the geographical context as a form of explanation for the feeling of belonging and longing to Morocco as their homeland was a constant in this study. Another volunteer working for a well-known Dutch initiative, referred to the village as being a physical part of her, in a spiritual way.

I feel like I meet a part of me, every time I set foot in the Rif. Though I am born in Amsterdam, it doesn't feel the same as the northern mountains of Morocco do. It's home in a special way, and that's why helping these people, and especially the children in the area get what I always had, feels like a mission of my soul. Sure, I gain blessings through the act of Zakat, but it's more than that for me. I cannot have enough of it, I constantly feel the urge of going back and keep giving.

The interviews remained filled with nostalgic emotions and participants who would open up and share the most personal stories. Interestingly enough, the same connections between personal motifs with the act of volunteering, was absent in the second study which included national Moroccan philanthropy and volunteer-organizations. The overall feeling of loyalty towards Morocco and their citizens was more formally described, in line with national political aims, and less emotional. This resulted in different motifs of the volunteers and paid staff appearing on the surface.

One of the paid volunteers (N=30) of an Amazigh organization in Rabat explained his motif:

My mother is Amazigh, she's from the South near the Todgha Valley, but she grew up in the suburbs of Marrakech. When she met my father, they moved to Rabat. I think it was because of his work, but I don't remember. My mother has always been a housewife, and I liked that as a kid. There was always someone home. But I also wanted her to be less isolated as I grew up. She had her own bubble in the neighborhood but outside of that, she didn't know anyone. So what we do at the association is that we strive to de-isolate these type of women so they become more part of society. But it's a big challenge to interact with them once you've found them in the first place because they are as isolated as my mother, and often don't speak another language besides their own tribal one which is often Tachelhiyt.⁵

The difficulty described here, was also mentioned by another paid staff member. She would refer to these isolated women as “those who do not want to be helped”:

We've tried several campaigns in the areas where these women mostly live, such as Salé and Tmara, just outside of Rabat. Most of them came from villages in the southern areas in Morocco, wanting to provide their children better chances than they could if they stayed in the village. Sure it's great that the government wants us to include these women in our social movements, but what do you do if they don't want to be included themselves?

The approaches by both staff-members were based on the Moroccan governmental aims for a higher development of rural Amazigh women. As stated by Sadiqi (2018), 90% of rural Amazigh women in Morocco are considered illiterate. This does not include the illiteracy of Amazigh women living in urban areas, which could mean the percentage is probably higher. The challenge to not enforce their own ideas on the development these women should go through, has been a shared motif by both staff members. It was remarkable to notice the absence of personal emotions in the overall of interviews. Here the analytical approach was more leading within their philanthropy and volunteering.

⁵ Socio-linguistically, the Tachelhiyt variety is part and parcel of the Tamazight dialect. However, since the native speakers in the Southern parts of Morocco refer to it as Tashelhiyt, I refer to it as such in this article.

Giving, volunteering and receiving: the comparison between diasporic volunteers, national NGOs and the perspective of the receiving end

As mentioned earlier, because Morocco is part of both the MENA and of Africa, we can discuss the flows of giving and volunteering in the both African and MENA literary perspective. Starting with the first, Murisa states that “in the 21st century, the landscape of African gifting has been expanding in diversity and the relative significance of different sources” (African Grantmakers Network, 2013; Murisa, 2018). “Three processes merit attention: innovation in foreign philanthropy, growth in corporate social investment (CSI), and variations in domestic resource mobilization (DRM), including Diaspora remittances” (Fowler, 2021, p. 7). According to the empirical data, the latter process remains the most influential when focusing on the perspective of the receiving end.

Fowler describes DRM as “a label covering an array of sources and practices that deploy the energy and assets of Africans, both on the continent or abroad. Four sources merit attention: (ultra)High-Net-Worth Individuals (U)HNWIs, middle-class private giving, diaspora remittances, and horizontal transfers below the radar of formal systems. There is an ongoing sociopolitical elevation of Africa’s HNWI’s with gift-giving priorities and mechanisms (Trust Africa, 2014). Studies of “giving back” by Africa’s HNWI’s show three themes standing out related to large-scale giving by African donors: 1. African donors of large gifts give mainly within their own countries. 2. The majority of gifts by African donors go towards addressing basic needs. 3. African donors of large gifts give mainly to the public sector and their own operating foundations, with limited funding reaching NGOs” (Schwier et al., 2020, p. 4). A recent study reconfirms that “HNWI’s do not favor NGOs as intermediaries for their philanthropic finance. Their philanthropic gifts jumped from US\$103 million in the period 2010 to 2019, to US\$269 million in 2020. The proportion allocated to NGOs, remained at 9%” (Hayi-Charters et al., 2021 p.8). This is similar to how Ennaji describes NGOs in Morocco. Namely, “those who achieved ground breaking initiatives, while, when also critically examining the internal organizations, the same NGOs could be charged with a lack of professionalism and a lack of accountability” (Ennaji, 2011, p. 79).

Arguable is also the post-colonial fundament due to the important note that the organizational structure in most NGOs has been completely inspired by existing association in France. According to Naciri, “this has been the case since the first feminist activists worked in philanthropic associations, after Morocco’s independency from France in 1956” (1998, p. 8). The problems in the organizations Ennaji points

to, were related to “a lack of training, information, and expertise in collective management and initiatives, as well as weak communications (both internally and externally) and a heavy reliance on international donor agencies for financing. The strategies and philanthropy they adopt enabled them to achieve sustainability through the empowerment of women with the support of the state, but lack doing so in a broader national way. Besides the internal and external lack of professionalism and organizational management, the presence of NGOs in the realization of rights for all women in Morocco reveals other issues in Moroccan society. These issues form the main reasons certain developments such as healthcare and education are very present in urban areas and less in rural areas. This led to complex and less smooth contributions between rural women and NGOs” (Ennaji 2011, p. 80). Important to address here are the perspectives of those on the receiving end who are often described as the subject NGOs serve, and to which extent they agree with or differ from the NGOs.

One of these participants was Hayat, who was interviewed in Rabat. Echoing statements made by other volunteers, she confirmed that the communication between isolated women and Morocco’s NGOs was not as she hoped it would be. She described herself as one of these isolated women:

My husband left when my son was two years old. I can't get a hold of him ever since. He just left. My mother came from Ait Hdidou to take care of my son while I would work to provide us a living. I work from 7 to 7, 7 days a week. Just across the street, in that juice bar. I see you coming in sometimes. It's nice to see people living abroad still speaking our own language (referring to Tachelhiyt).

When asked why she did not ask local women organizations to help her, she replied pointing to her own “lack” of finding these organizations: “And suppose I would find them, what would they do? I would still need to feed myself and my family.”

Meeting and interviewing Amazigh women who migrated from the rural areas of Morocco to Rabat, repeatedly confirmed certain needs could not be filled by outsiders. In the case of Hayat that need is providing a living for her family. Several participants used language as a tool to describe someone as an outsider, or not. Amazigh women in both rural and urban areas mentioned language, or oral communication, as a remaining major influential factor in the choices they make. It either motivates them to connect with volunteers, be it diasporic or locals, or

not. However, because most part of local volunteering takes place in the urban environment, automatically it belongs to the Darija-speaking part of the country. This is due to their monolingualism as Sadiqi (2003) describes. As most Amazigh women, both living in the rural and urban areas, are illiterate and presumably monolingual, they use oral genres to organize the world around them, and therefore achieve personal and social 'gains' in their daily use of language. When dealing with a volunteer organization, be it an NGO or something similar, they keep assuming that they will remain dependent on the ones who do speak Darija or other official languages. As Tachelhiyt does belong amongst Tamazight languages, its daily use is inherently different. This keeps the gap between Morocco's civil society and its Amazigh groups alive and therefore forces women like Hayat to learn the official Darija language themselves. Hayat added:

My neighbor owns the juice bar, so when he heard about my husband abandoned us, he told me that I could work for him. Though he's from Tafraout (Souss-area), we understand each other. You know how it works. I was taught Darija by my colleagues. Step by step I knew how to find my way outside in the city, because I could ask people on the street if I didn't know something. You can't be sure that the one you ask a question in Tachelhiyt would also respond back in Tachelhiyt. So I made it easier for myself and my family.

Participants in earlier interviews, which took place from 2016 to 2020 in Ait Hdidou, pointed to the same ease that was found in communities outside the rural areas and in learning Darija. It is here where similarity can be found between diaspora communities outside Morocco and those who migrated within the borders. Forms of internal rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration evolved following the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912. De Haas argues that "initially, the new forms of migration were an extension and intensification of older patterns of seasonal and circular migration. However, migration gradually tended to become more long-term and migrants tended to migrate further away and, increasingly, abroad" (De Haas 2001, p. 160).

According to De Haas, "in colonial times, two forms of internal migration prevailed" (De Haas 2001, p. 160). "The first was seasonal migration to agricultural areas in northern and western Morocco, such as the Moulouya, the Middle Atlas, the Gharb, the Tadla, and Doukkala. In 1954, an estimated 1,300 Todghawis, or 6.4 percent of the total population, participated in this type of seasonal migration. Like Algerian

migration, this in fact concerned a continuation of older, pre-colonial migration patterns, which were, however, intensified due to the increased demand for agricultural labor at the modern farms established by colonizers.

The second type of internal migration was the movement to cities on the Atlantic coast, notably Casablanca and Rabat” (De Haas 2003, p. 160). This region increasingly developed into the industrial and urban heartland of modernizing Morocco, which increasingly attracted migrants from the South. My participants can be considered members of these groups, e.g. Hayat and the isolated women in Salé mentioned in earlier interviews. “Modern rural-to-urban labor migration started in the early 1940s, and rapidly increased afterwards. More than seasonal migration, this rural-to-urban migration was a deviation from pre-colonial migration patterns” (De Haas 2003, p. 161). In comparison to seasonal migration, “this migration was relatively long-term, with most migrants settling on a semi-permanent basis in new quarters or slums of the swelling cities. From the Todgha, rural-to-urban migration was particularly directed at Rabat-Salé. Migrants from the Todgha tended to settle in certain quarters. Significant concentrations of Todghawis can be found in (former) slums, but also in currently upgraded popular quarters such as Takkadoum and Yacoub El Mansour in Rabat and Tabriquet in Salé” (Büchner, 1986, p. 108-109).

Contrary to the above, both national and international migration did not take place in Ait Hdidou until the late 2000s. Especially older participants described the flow of migration from the village to other parts of Morocco as “*a move of the youth*”. Hassan, the owner of a café on the Avenue Allal Ben Abdellah in Rabat, referred to the village as “*the only place where Amazigh identity can survive*”. He moved to Rabat in 2001. He added:

There was no future for me in the village. And along with me were my peers. Some did stay, but they (the ones who stayed in the village) can't blame us for wanting other things. An easier life in the city.

When asking about other actors (within Morocco’s governance system or civil society) who could be of help to create that easier life in the village too, he responded:

How can one (CSO) help you if they (CSO) don't know what you need? So besides wanting a better life for myself and

children, I sent money back to the village so that they could buy whatever and whenever they needed something.

Hassan's reference to CSOs in Morocco is similar to an experience shared with one of the diasporic volunteers:

We came to the village of Ait Hdidou, and had all this stuff that we collected through our social media. Toys for children to play with, books, pens, you name it. When we got there, I became sick to my stomach. I realized we collected everything, except for the things they really need. And that's when I asked myself: do I even know what they need? I decided to ask the women around, using a translator because I don't speak Tachelhiyt and neither do my other Moroccan volunteers. Most of them are from other, Darija speaking, parts of Morocco. That's when I learned they were much better provided with clothes, food supplies and health care. I had no idea before. I thought: We're Moroccans ourselves, even if we're living in the Netherlands, we know our country enough. The opposite is true.

Another volunteer added:

We (diaspora volunteers) think we can help our country by giving everything we didn't have when our families lived here (before they migrated to the Netherlands). But Morocco changed, and it's citizens change too. Therefore their needs. Sure there is still not enough health care, education, and equal rights, but no research is done to know exactly what people need. Morocco's own volunteers don't even know. How are we supposed to know? The money is collected before the volunteers really know what to do with it. It's the opposite of how things should go and very post-colonial if you ask me.

Referring to the post-colonial aspect and his opinion on it, he added:

Every diasporic volunteer-organization should do research first, and then decide who and how to help. They often don't know the law, I didn't either until the last years of my volunteering. I realize how I should have done things differently, but I didn't know better. That's why my criticism is as loud now, people (diaspora in the Netherlands) keep setting up these funds to collect money for the ones in need. Using

pictures of people in Morocco living in a certain (pathetic) state. It's just not ok."

This critic is similar to that of another volunteer:

I went along on the trip, and thought there was going to be a big group of volunteers, but it was only me and a few others on the airport. We went to Morocco, and specifically to the areas where the overall spoken language is Tachelhiyt. But here's the thing: I'm from these areas myself and I know from childhood memories that there are also people who are provided here, who don't need our philanthropy, etc. In fact, they need other things. Not even medical health, but more tools on how to improve their mental health. Not one single volunteer is aware of that, I realized.

Such criticism could lead to several points of discussion: the constant existence and motif of diasporic volunteer organizations, the gap between the latter and the country's own CSOs, the sense of post-colonial behavior mentioned about both voluntary groups, and finally how the receiving end acts upon both forms of volunteering and philanthropy.

Discussion


As stated earlier, though diasporic volunteering organizations do include religious terminology in their online marketing and strategy, participants in this research denied their religious identity as a motif for their volunteering and philanthropy. Personal motifs showed their cultural identity as Moroccans, rather than their religious identity as Muslims. This is in line with the importance of both culture and Islam in the upbringing of first generation migrants in the Netherlands (de Haas, 2003). El Ayadi et al. (2007), stated that Moroccan volunteers should be viewed as similar as the diasporic volunteers. Serving their country (as in Morocco) in its development by focusing on isolated, marginalized (often Amazigh) groups as form of public service. This study demonstrates that religion is mentioned in their online strategy but not in their own personal terminology during the interviews. It is therefore fair to argue that both voluntary groups perform their volunteering and philanthropy based on their sense of belonging to the receiving end. International diaspora (e.g. in the Netherlands) does so through its Moroccan-Amazigh identity, and national diaspora (e.g. in the city of

Rabat) does so through their Moroccan-national identity. We can therefore conclude that both groups perform cross-border philanthropy, but in a different order with different borders to cross. However, the striking results of diasporic volunteers reaching isolated, rural areas more than Morocco's CSOs, demand further attention. As another respondent living in the rural area of Ait Hdidou: "Sadaqah from you or your parents is the same for us. We know it comes from a person of God (al-mou'meen)."

It is here where the terminology on social media proves to make a difference. Due to the fact that religion (in this study Islam) can organize several diasporic groups who donate through money, gifts or time in a horizontal way (see Fowler, 2021), the receiving end sees their philanthropy as a religious act. Coming from those who also share an ethnic identity. This creates a multi-layered connection between the giving and the receiving end. Second, the use of religious motifs, makes diasporic organizations not only have an audience of Moroccan diaspora, but also others (such as Turkish, Surinamese, Hindu, Iraqi, etc.). All diasporic organizations in this study had their philanthropic focus on Morocco, but also had volunteers with other ethnicities joining them in their mission. It is here where it is fair to state that diaspora cross-border philanthropy not only crosses borders between countries, but also between diaspora groups. Bound by the shared identity as Muslims, diasporic volunteering and philanthropy could therefore be considered as faith-based. However, if the latter is described by citizens on the receiving end as more effective, it is only fair to further examine the possibility of a collaboration between diasporic volunteers, from this perspective on. Pointing to those living inside the borders and those living outside. As we have seen, both groups often cross the same borders.


To visualize this possibility, it is important to be clear about the flow diaspora volunteering in Morocco currently takes place which was demonstrated in the data:

Figure 1



Combining these two flows, leads to the following, perhaps more inclusive and effective perspective on diasporic volunteering and philanthropy, where both religion and secularism are combined in one mission to serve:

Figure 2



financial security and stability. If both national and international diasporic group take this desire as the main-force in their philanthropy and volunteering, the realization of Figure 2 could be easily achieved. Making such propositions creates crucial points where the true aim of CSOs becomes loud and clear.

As mentioned earlier, this study shows that both philanthropic groups perform cross-border philanthropy. However, due to their different diaspora identity, they do not cross the same borders. For example, diasporic international volunteers often speak the Amazigh language which is needed to reach the Amazigh groups that they aim to help. However, this study, amongst others like Sadiqi and Ennaji (2012) diasporic national groups in Morocco lack this important criteria. Addition to this, the national diasporic group does have the important national insights and information that the international diasporic group does not. Throughout this study, the argument is presented for a collaboration, as demonstrated in figure 2. Such collaboration could address the issue of financial dependency on international donors: direct philanthropic aid through national NGOs could provide strategic support (rural-based, Tamazight-speaking). This may allow national NGOs to go beyond donors' priorities, which may or not be aligned with the actual needs of marginalized Amazigh communities, further disposing of the post-colonial behavior.

To summarize, this paper demonstrates a collaboration between both types of diasporic cross-border philanthropists could lead to, one: disposing of post-colonial behavior, and two: a far better outreach to Morocco's still often isolated marginalized Amazigh groups. Finally, all of this could result in the socio-economic progress both the government and the country's own civil society has been aiming for over the last 75 years, but still struggle to realize.

Conclusion

In this article, the importance of diasporic cross-border philanthropists in Morocco's civil society and its development is demonstrated. By presenting several interviews from my empirical research in Morocco and the Netherlands, which have been collected between 2016 and 2021, the conclusion can be drawn that the different flows of diasporic international philanthropy hold an interesting capability to co-exist with the actors in the country's own civil society. Besides, the outreach of the international philanthropy seems to find its way more easily into Morocco's rural areas compared to the Moroccan national NGOs, reaching the most isolated Amazigh societies. As stated earlier,

according to Sadiqi and Ennaji, “the main beneficiaries of the secular aid done by the Moroccan national NGOs are still people from the upper and middle class living in urban areas, excluding the Amazigh in often rural areas” (2012, p. 15).

Literature within the field of philanthropy and transnationalism has emphasized several flows of voluntarism and philanthropy between different continents, countries and ((non)-religious) communities. However, a small sub-set of existing literature examines the comparison of both national and cross-border philanthropy from a diasporic perspective. In addition to that, little research has been done on cross-border philanthropy between countries with no or little (post-colonial) history, such as the Netherlands and Morocco. The latter two have been central in this article. Similar to the other papers included in this special issue, this paper also contributes to several fields of knowledge. First, that of both global and local cross-border philanthropy between Europe and the MENA. Second, that of cross-border philanthropy between Europe and Africa. As stated earlier, Morocco forms an unique position from both the MENA and African perspective. Third, by providing an in-depth understanding of this specific type of philanthropy from the perspective of the receiving end, Morocco’s own CSOs and the international diasporic communities could be invited to further elaborate whether collaboration is possible, as demonstrated in figure 2. When speaking of international diasporic communities, we are naturally considering communities beyond those covered in this case study too. Further elaboration could lead to the invention of tools that help to facilitate this cross-border activity for the various philanthropic purposes aimed by several civil field actors. Namely, serving those who remain isolated, marginalized and segregated in a country with similar cultural, social and religious complexities like Morocco. Finally, serving the important role Moroccan diaspora has in the highly effective form of cross-border philanthropy.

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