1. When we study preferences, we study decisions over tradeoffs. That is to say, we do not study whether people like x or y, e.g., risk or certainty, payoff now or later. Instead, we study how people choose between two bundles such as (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2). In other words, we are interested in measuring and comparing the strength of preference between attributes to understand decisions.

2. People make decisions not based on utility itself, but on the differences of utilities between the chosen one and the counterfactual ones.

3. If we ask people in a survey how likely they are to take risks in life and how often they speed drive, we will find high predictive power of the former for the latter. For some this result is informative but for some others this is just like asking the same question twice.

4. If we elicit people's choices over lotteries of small amounts of money in a survey and we ask how often they speed drive, we may find some weak predictive power of the former for the latter. For some this result is informative but for some others this is, to the contrary, not sufficiently informative.

5. A benefit of decision theory models is that they are structured to provide a benchmark, i.e., a normative prescription.

6. A normative benchmark gives a criterion for whether a preference is "optimal" or, "rational," where rational decisions can be defined by satisfying monotonicity, transitivity, and independence axioms. Economists often take this as objective truth and forget that this definition of rationality is subjective.

7. The independence axiom is the "straight jacket" of expected utility model. Most behavioural models, e.g. prospect theory, relax the independence axiom but maintain weak separability, which is the equivalent of monotonicity.

8. For intertemporal risky decisions, any model that first aggregates over risk and then time, i.e. assumes weak separability between time points, predicts that intertemporal correlation is irrelevant for decision making.

9. Risk aversion is about people preferring the expected value of a lottery to the lottery - a preference of certainty over risk; however, loss aversion is not about people preferring gains to loss - that is already implied by monotonicity. Loss aversion is about the steepness of the utility function - that the disutility of loss is larger than the utility of gains.

10. Contrary to many claims, the present bias - or violation of stationarity - does not lead to time inconsistency, if time invariance is also violated.

11. In life, people often make decisions while dealing with many competing attention absorbing interests. We as decision analysis researchers isolate one type of decisions and focus on only that. Yet in many cases analysing isolated decisions imposes overly strong limits to the questions we investigate, and a more holistic perspective is an improvement. Economists should be more aware of this than they are now.

1,2,6,7,8 are related to the dissertation; 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 are unrelated to the dissertation; 1 - 10 are academically defensible.